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The Middle Powers Initiative, a program of the Global Security Institute, organized an Extraordi-
nary Strategy Consultation on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2005 Review Confer-
ence in cooperation with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter at The Carter Center in Atlanta, 
Georgia, January 26-28, 2005.  
Entitled Atlanta Consultation II: On the Future of the NPT, the gathering involved high-level repre-
sentatives of key governments and was modeled after the successful Atlanta Consultation I that MPI 
held at The Carter Center in 2000.
A report from Atlanta Consultation I is available at http://www.middlepowers.org/atlantareport.pdf
The NPT is essential to global security. Every country in the world, other than Pakistan, India 
and Israel (and now North Korea), are members. It establishes a legal and moral norm to stop the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. For example, Iraq’s nuclear program was properly terminated in 
the early 1990s based on this legal norm. The NPT is based on a core bargain under which all the 
non-nuclear-armed countries have agreed they would not acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, the 
ﬁ ve nuclear-armed countries (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) 
have agreed to take good-faith disarmament steps, with the eventual goal of the complete, worldwide 
elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty has been remarkably successful on the ﬁ rst part of the 
bargain, but not so successful on the second.
The Treaty was indeﬁ nitely extended in 1995 based on a reafﬁ rmation of the core bargain. Every ﬁ ve 
years, the NPT undergoes a formal review at the United Nations, during which important decisions 
are made about the Treaty’s future. The next Review Conference will take place May 2-27, 2005. 
In the months prior to each Review Conference, countries form negotiating positions. Many coun-
tries currently assert that the nuclear weapon states are failing to make adequate progress toward the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. 
The polarized debate over the core bargain of the NPT must not tear the Treaty apart. MPI is work-
ing to build up a powerful middle ground to carry the Treaty forward. The 2005 Review Conference 
will not receive very much public attention. Nevertheless, the consequences of failure at that historic 
moment could be subsequent erosion of the non-proliferation regime and the spread of nuclear 
weapons to many more states. In today’s world, with terrorists and other dangerous non-state actors 
and unstable governments, we cannot allow this to happen.
Toward this end, MPI’s Atlanta Consultation II: On the Future of the NPT helped identify workable 
proposals for governments to consider as they prepare for the 2005 Review.  
MPI hopes that its work—including the wide distribution of this Final Report—will contribute to 
the worldwide diplomatic effort to preserve and strengthen one of the world’s most important trea-
ties.
Zachary Allen
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i MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Middle Powers Initiative recommends the following policy options to states party to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) for their consideration: 
1. A successful outcome of the Review Conference depends on its ability to address equally every 
aspect of the Treaty. The strengthening of the commitments contained in the NPT regarding 
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament should be done in a balanced way. 
2. The Review Conference must refer to the substance of the consensus decisions from the 1995 
and 2000 Conferences, including the 13 Practical Steps adopted in 2000 and the Resolution on 
the Middle East adopted in 1995. 
3. The United States and Russia should build upon their progress in the Moscow Treaty by apply-
ing the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and veriﬁ cation to reductions under the Treaty, 
and by negotiating further deep, veriﬁ ed, and irreversible cuts in their total arsenals, encompass-
ing both warheads and delivery systems. 
4. Russia and the United States should engage in a wider process of control of their non-strategic 
weapons, through formalization and veriﬁ cation of the 1991-1992 initiatives, transparency steps, 
security measures, U.S. withdrawal of its bombs deployed on the territories of NATO countries, 
and commencement of negotiations regarding further reduction/elimination of non-strategic 
weapons. 
5. Nuclear weapon states should implement their commitment to decreasing the operational read-
iness of nuclear weapons systems (“de-alerting”) by planning and executing a program to stand 
down their nuclear forces, culminating in a global stand-down by the 2010 Review Conference. 
6. Nuclear weapon states should further implement their commitment to diminishing the role 
of nuclear weapons in their security policies by not researching or developing modiﬁ ed or new 
nuclear weapons and by beginning negotiations on a legally-binding instrument on the non-use of 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. 
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7. States should begin and rapidly conclude negotiations on a treaty banning the production of 
ﬁ ssile materials for nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Co-
ordinator and the mandate contained therein, with the understanding that negotiations can and 
should address a range of issues, including dealing with existing military materials. As soon as 
possible a technical advisory panel should be created to assist with issues regarding veriﬁ cation of 
the treaty. In addition, states should work to develop a global inventory of weapons-useable ﬁ ssile 
materials and warheads, and the nuclear weapon states should accelerate placing their “excess” 
military ﬁ ssile materials under international veriﬁ cation. States should seriously consider propos-
als to ban production of all weapons-usable ﬁ ssile materials, and to establish multilateral controls 
on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology and a moratorium on supply and 
acquisition in the meantime. 
8. Adherence to the Additional Protocol on Safeguards should become a universal standard for 
compliance with non-proliferation obligations and treatment as a member in good standing of the 
NPT with access to nuclear fuel. 
9. Prior to or at the Review Conference, a ﬁ rm agreement should be reached on a program of 
work in the Conference on Disarmament that includes a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear 
disarmament. Achieving such an agreement in advance would greatly enhance the prospects for a 
cooperative outcome to the conference. Should it not prove possible to overcome the deadlock on 
a program of work, alternative venues should be pursued. 
10. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date. In the 
meantime, states should continue to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing, fund the Prepara-
tory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, and support completion 
of the International Monitoring System.
11. States should use the opportunity provided by the NPT review process to build upon the 13 
Practical Steps to undertake deeper consideration of the legal, political and technical requirements 
for the elimination of nuclear weapons, in order to identify steps that could be taken unilater-
ally, bilaterally, and multilaterally that would lead to complete nuclear disarmament. The United 
Kingdom’s initiative on veriﬁ cation, the New Agenda Coalition’s proposals on security assurances 
and the strengthening and expanding of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are positive examples in this 
regard. Such consideration should include the investigation of means to enhance security without 
relying on nuclear weapons.
iii MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE 
INTRODUCTION: 
BALANCE, BARGAIN, BRIDGE
Balance. If there is one word that sums up the challenge of the Seventh Review of the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty, May 2-27, 2005 in New York, it is balance. The states party to the NPT must ﬁ nd a 
balance in the implementation of the disarmament and non-proliferation obligations of the NPT. 
This was a dominant ﬁ nding of a Strategy Consultation conducted by the Middle Powers Initiative 
January 26-28, 2005 at The Carter Center, Atlanta.
Bargain. Balance is necessary because a bargain was struck when the NPT came into force in 1970. 
The nuclear weapon states agreed to negotiate in good faith the elimination of their nuclear weapons 
in return for the non-nuclear states not acquiring nuclear weapons and receiving access to nuclear 
energy. The consensus recognition of that bargain enabled the indeﬁ nite extension of the NPT in 
1995.
Bridge. By emphasizing a balanced approach to implementing the NPT bargain, the MPI Strategy 
Consultation laid the groundwork for a bridge to be built between the nuclear weapon states and 
the non-nuclear states. If that bridge is to be buttressed, the center positions in the nuclear weapons 
debate must be strengthened. The center is occupied by the New Agenda Coalition countries along 
with a number of NATO states and like-minded countries. By agreeing on a pragmatic agenda for 
the implementation of key priorities—in both the disarmament and non-proliferation sides of the 
Treaty—the states could close the underlying gaps in the NPT debate. The MPI Strategy Consulta-
tion tried to engender strategies to help balance, bargain and bridge. Many of these ideas and recom-
mendations are respectfully proffered in this report.
Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C.
Chairman, Middle Power Initiative
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FOREWORD
“A peace based on terror is unworthy of civilization.”
                                                                                         — Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000)
 Founder, Global Security Institute
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the staff at The Carter Center demonstrate excellence in 
service to humanity. We are grateful for the grace and generosity with which they hosted Atlanta 
Consultation II: On the Future of the NPT, and for their long-term commitment to addressing the 
threat of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons pose a greater threat to our collective security than any 
problem such weapons seek to solve.
President Carter effectively articulated the illogic of possessing and relying on the threat of nuclear 
weapons while simultaneously condemning others who seek them.
Security imbalances created by a handful of states intransigently clinging to their privilege to possess 
nuclear weapons can be understood by the concept of the “tragedy of the commons.” In the clas-
sic example, a shepherd seeks to maximize her short-term self-interest by overgrazing the commons, 
thereby stimulating others to do the same. An individual actor maximizing his self-interest without 
proper regard for the whole ultimately injures himself as well as the whole. This insight is often used 
to address environmental degradation and the depletion of common natural resources, but it applies 
with equal clarity to explaining the crisis in global security. 
When one nation or a small group of nations tries to maximize their self-interest by relying on nu-
clear weapons in the name of “national security,” and undermines the strength of legal instruments 
calling for collective security, the common security of the planet is threatened.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is premised on universalizing the norm that nuclear 
weapons themselves pose a threat to us all. That is why the Treaty seeks both to stop their spread and 
advance their elimination. We gathered in Atlanta because accomplishing the NPT’s goals is essential 
for the security of all.
Although those of us who gathered in Atlanta were diplomats and experts, working to eliminate 
nuclear weapons is an effort that all with good conscience should join. As President Carter said, 
“there is no more important subject.”
Jonathan Granoff
President, Global Security Institute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Middle Powers Initiative organized an Extraordinary Strategy Consultation on the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) 2005 Review Conference in cooperation with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter at 
The Carter Center in Atlanta, January 26-28, 2005. Atlanta Consultation II: On the Future of the 
NPT involved 75 participants and observers, including high-level representatives of key governments 
and non-governmental expert practitioners. The Consultation was modeled after the successful Atlanta 
Consultation I, which MPI held at The Carter Center in 2000.
The important dialogue during Atlanta Consultation II formed the basis for MPI’s recommended 
policy options (see Recommendations) presented herein to the states party to the NPT for their 
consideration.
Atlanta Consultation II was based on the initiatives of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and MPI’s 
brieﬁ ng paper, Building a Nuclear Weapons-Free Future (See Appendix B). Well-established but unfulﬁ lled 
pragmatic and effective steps toward nuclear disarmament were emphasized at the Consultation. 
They include reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons; negotiating a ﬁ ssile materials treaty; 
applying the principles of transparency and irreversibility to U.S.-Russian arms reduction agreements; 
controlling/eliminating non-strategic weapons held by the United States and Russia; establishing a 
body in the Conference on Disarmament (C.D.) to deal with nuclear disarmament; and bringing the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force. 
The entire nuclear non-proliferation regime is under stress from the policies and doctrines of the nuclear 
weapon states and from attempts by more states to go nuclear. As President Carter said at the opening 
plenary, “It is disturbingly obvious that there has been no improvement over the situation as it was described 
in our previous meeting. In fact, proliferation and the behavior of the nuclear weapon states with regard to 
disarmament have worsened over the past ﬁ ve years.”
The Consultation noted how shocking it is that, after three two-week meetings of the Preparatory 
Committee, an Agenda for the Review Conference has not yet been agreed upon. It is improper for any 
state to obstruct the setting of an Agenda and attempt to go forward without recognizing the results 
of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The Agenda for 2005 must refer to the speciﬁ c matters of 
substance as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and also the outcome of the 
2000 Review Conference, including developments affecting the operation and purposes of the Treaty.
The President-designate of the Review Conference has a right to expect support from the parties on 
this issue. Lack of an agreed agenda may block the work of the Conference and precipitate a long and 
fruitless discussion, preventing meaningful debate on the substantive issues. Different parties have 
different views on what would constitute a successful Conference. All parties agree, however, that 
the Conference should strive to preserve and strengthen the credibility of the Treaty so that it can be 
effective and lasting.
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MPI calls on all governments to assert in public declarations—prior to the 2005 Review Conference—the 
integrity of the strengthened review process decided upon in 1995 and enhanced in 2000. Any reopening 
of the debate on commitments agreed upon at the Review Conferences since 1995 would invariably lead 
to an undermining of the Treaty. It is of utmost importance for the review process to continue from the 
point of the 13 Practical Steps arrived at by consensus in 2000 and move forward from there.
A successful outcome is linked to the ability of the Review Conference to address equally every aspect 
of the Treaty. The strengthening of the commitments contained in the NPT regarding nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament should be done in a balanced way. Reinforcement of non-
proliferation provisions should be carried out along with a stronger adherence to the commitment to 
nuclear disarmament contained in Article VI.
A key issue is how to preserve the integrity and credibility of the Treaty in face of recent doubts about 
compliance and of withdrawn support from political commitments accepted in previous Review 
Conferences. Lack of trust in the fulﬁ llment of non-proliferation obligations and backtracking from 
previous disarmament commitments only erodes the credibility of the Treaty. 
On the disarmament side of the equation, agreement is within reach on a program of work in the 
Conference on Disarmament encompassing commencement of negotiations on a ﬁ ssile materials treaty 
and establishment of a body to deal with nuclear disarmament. It is vital to ﬁ nally and deﬁ nitively 
overcome the deadlock that has stalemated the C.D. for years, prior to or at the Review Conference. 
Doing so in advance of the Conference would greatly enhance prospects for a cooperative outcome.
The present crisis regarding compliance with non-proliferation obligations by North Korea, and to 
a lesser extent Iran, points to the obvious need to ensure that the safeguards and veriﬁ cation system 
provided for in Article III works effectively. In light of recent episodes that gave rise to accusations of lack 
of compliance, there is a need to strengthen the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty. Adherence 
to the Additional Protocol on Safeguards should become a universal standard for compliance with 
non-proliferation obligations and treatment as a member in good standing of the NPT with access to 
nuclear fuel.
A more far-reaching non-proliferation-related proposal has come from IAEA Director-General Mohamed 
ElBaradei, who called for “working towards multilateral control over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel 
cycle—enrichment, reprocessing, and the management and disposal of spent fuel.” The matter is extremely 
sensitive. Non-nuclear weapon states regard access to technology as their right under Article IV of the 
NPT. However, it was understood from the beginning of the nuclear age that the spread of nuclear 
technology, especially the means of producing fuel for nuclear reactors, would also provide the foundation 
for nuclear weapons programs. For reasons of effectiveness, legitimacy, and promotion of global norms 
generally, states should seriously consider proposals for multilateral controls.
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PRESERVING THE BARGAIN: A BALANCED APPROACH
Atlanta Consultation II: On the Future of the NPT was held with the widespread feeling that the NPT 
regime is under stress, but that perception was tempered by an unwillingness to declare the Treaty in crisis, 
which would suggest that the Treaty has outlived its usefulness. Numerous participants referred to the 
image evoked by the report of Secretary-General Koﬁ  Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change that the world is “approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime 
could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” Looking back at his address to the 
ﬁ rst Atlanta Consultation in 2000 and ahead to this spring’s Review Conference, former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter said, “Prospects for success are not good, because of the dire state of long-standing 
tediously negotiated international arms control agreements and the present indifference among nuclear 
weapon states to their decline or demise.” 
The concern over the prospects for the Review Conference did not, however, translate into despair as 
participants promoted a long list of immediate and long-term policies to fulﬁ ll the disarmament and 
non-proliferation obligations embedded in the Treaty. No consensus was expected or sought during 
the Consultation; it was a meeting of dialogue. Nevertheless, certain themes resonated throughout 
the meeting, chief among them the belief that a successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference 
requires a balanced approach toward all the commitments in the Treaty, with the consensus decisions 
of the 1995 and 2000 conferences—especially the 13 Practical Steps—remaining fundamental to the 
disarmament and arms control regime.
Hon. Marian Hobbs, New Zealand’s Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, said, “At the NPT 
Review Conference in May, we need to build on the 13 Steps. We need to position the NPT into 
an abolition framework. At the moment we are in danger of wasting energy arguing which steps are 
more important and forgetting about the end goal that we agreed to—the end/abolition of nuclear 
weapons—in Article VI of the Treaty.”
She continued, “If disarmament and non-proliferation are seen as two separate processes, progress will 
be difﬁ cult. There will continue to be a competitive tug-of-war between the nuclear weapon states on 
the one hand calling for a focus on non-proliferation and the other groups directing greater attention 
towards disarmament. An abolition approach avoids competition by shaping actions in ways that 
contribute to the gradual prohibition of nuclear weapons themselves and to both non-proliferation 
and disarmament.”
Ambassador Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier of 
Sweden said, “It is detrimental to the whole 
regime when we ﬁ nd that consensus agreements 
freely entered into at a Review Conference, 
such as the practical steps towards nuclear 
disarmament agreed in 2000, are not only 
left by the wayside but also may not even be 
referred to, as happened at the last preparatory 
committee…. What conclusions can we draw 
when today, only ﬁ ve years later, some nuclear Dr. Jane Goodall (and “Mr. H.”) listening to President Carter.
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weapon states, in particular the 
United States and France, seem 
determined to delete it from the 
agenda.”
In the months leading up to 
the 2005 Review Conference, 
supporters of the NPT have 
been debating whether the most 
appropriate strategy in May 
2005 is to respond to the U.S. 
hard-line position with a hard-
line approach of their own, or to 
develop a pragmatic strategy that 
defends and advances the Treaty, 
leaving the option of compromise 
to the United States and its 
closest allies. Participants for the 
most part favored a proactive 
strategy. Rather than reacting 
to the anticipated U.S. strategy 
of trying to focus the Review 
Conference on noncompliance 
issues, speakers advocated a 
proactive defense of the 13 
Practical Steps and a strategy 
that emphasizes all three “pillars” 
of the NPT bargain: nuclear 
disarmament, non-proliferation, 
and peaceful uses. The NPT as a 
“bargain” was a recurring theme. 
In other words, each pillar helps 
support the other two. 
The strategy of middle powers 
t h e r e f o r e  c o u l d  i n v o l v e 
highlighting and defending all 
three pillars of the NPT bargain: 
disarmament, non-proliferation, 
PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
…[I]t is disturbingly obvious 
that … proliferation and the 
behavior of the nuclear weapon 
states with regard to disarmament 
have worsened over the past ﬁ ve 
years…
Prospects for this year’s discussions 
are not encouraging. I have heard 
that the PrepComm for the 
forthcoming Non-Proliferation 
Treaty talks have so far failed even 
to achieve an agenda because of 
the deep divisions between the 
nuclear powers who seek to stop 
proliferation without meeting their 
own disarmament commitments, 
and the Non-aligned movement, 
whose demands include firm disarmament commitments and 
consideration of the Israeli arsenal. 
The Middle Powers Initiative approach remains an effort to build a 
bridge between the New Agenda Coalition countries (Brazil, Egypt, 
Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) and the eight 
NATO states that voted last year for a New Agenda Resolution calling 
for implementing commitments already made to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Tragically, Britain, France and the United States all voted against 
this resolution. 
Our common goal is simply stated: “To exert leverage on the nuclear 
powers to take minimum steps to save the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
in 2005.” Prospects for success are not good, because of the dire state 
of long-standing tediously negotiated international arms control 
agreements and the present indifference among nuclear weapons states 
to their decline or demise…
There is no more important subject than the one you are addressing, 
and illogical [emphasis original] approaches to resolving the problem 
threaten world peace. The tragic and unnecessary Iraq invasion was 
based on false allegations of Saddam Hussein having a nuclear weapons 
program, and the threat of war in Korea in 1994 was narrowly averted 
after Kim Il Sung announced the expulsion of international inspectors 
with the prospect of reprocessing nuclear fuel. Since then, the Korean 
situation has deteriorated badly. More recently, high ofﬁ cials have 
made public insinuations of American or Israeli military interventions 
in Iran. 
and access to technology for peaceful uses. This would mean, for example, states would continue to 
support the SORT reductions but also argue that protocols for veriﬁ cation and irreversibility should 
be added. A positive development is that, as it has reported to NPT Preparatory Committee meetings, 
the United Kingdom is exploring technologies that could be used for multilateral veriﬁ cation of 
warhead dismantlement. The non-compliance issues concerning North Korea and Iran will have to 
be confronted, but so will U.S. rejection of key disarmament measures endorsed in the 13 Practical 
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Steps. Iran’s nuclear program has to be on the agenda, but so does 
Israel’s, since no progress can be made on the creation of a Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East—as endorsed by the NPT 
Review Conference and the U.N. Security Council—without the 
good-faith involvement of all states in the region.
Paul Meyer, Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament, noted, “The 
perception that the nuclear weapon states are not serious about 
fulﬁ lling their disarmament obligations at the same time that 
they are calling for the non-nuclear weapon states to assume ever 
more stringent non-proliferation commitments, exacerbates the 
discriminatory aspects of the Treaty and contributes to an erosion 
of conﬁ dence in its integrity and authority.”
Minister Hobbs took the same theme and built on it, looking 
past the NPT and reminding the Consultation, “There appears 
to be a growing divide in the international community between 
those countries (including the nuclear weapon states) prepared to 
take stronger action—unilaterally or through coalitions—against 
potential proliferators, and those countries calling instead on the 
nuclear weapon states to lead by example and take greater steps 
towards disarming their own nuclear weapons.”
“This split could be bridged,” she continued, “and progress made 
on both non-proliferation and disarmament fronts, by adopting an 
abolition framework, i.e. through advancing norms which further 
de-legitimize nuclear weapons regardless of who may possess or 
aspire to possess them, and further developing the mechanisms 
which prevent their acquisition and provide for their systematic and 
veriﬁ ed elimination.”
Amb. Meyer saw a “crisis of non-compliance” by potential 
proliferators like North Korea and Iran and by the failure of nuclear 
states to disarm. 
“It is the seeming 
complacency of 
the major powers, 
o r  e v e n  t h e i r 
complicity, with 
regard to the crisis 
of confidence in 
the NPT that has 
middle powers, 
l i k e  C a n a d a , 
concerned,” he 
said. “This treaty, 
AMBASSADOR PAUL MEYER
CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO 
THE UNITED NATIONS FOR 
DISARMAMENT
The percept ion that  the 
nuclear weapon states are not 
serious about fulfilling their 
disarmament obligations at 
the same time that they are 
calling for the non-nuclear 
weapon states to assume ever 
more stringent non-proliferation 
commitments, exacerbates the 
discriminatory aspects of the 
Treaty and contributes to an 
erosion of confidence in its 
integrity and authority…
I fear that until greater concern 
is shown by the world’s political 
leadership in the pathetic 
performance of multilateral 
disarmament and the erosion 
of the NPT’s authority (and a 
greater resolve to do something 
about it) ,  these corrosive 
processes will continue…
What does this all mean for the 
May Review Conference and our 
approach to it? From Canada’s 
perspective, the situation calls 
for rapid remedial action. This 
should include ensuring a 
balanced and practical outcome 
that  re inforces  the  three 
fundamental commitments of 
the NPT: to non-proliferation, 
to disarmament and to the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energies. 
We believe such an outcome 
should: i) embrace recognition of 
the IAEA’s Additional Protocol 
as the contemporary safeguards 
standard under Art III; ii) agree 
on new approaches to govern 
sensitive technologies of the fuel 
cycle so they cannot be diverted 
to proscribed purposes; iii) 
require a compliant status with 
Treaty commitments prior to 
any exercise of withdrawal rights; 
and iv) demonstrate signiﬁ cant 
progress in implementing the 
agreed “benchmarks” of the 13 
steps on nuclear disarmament.
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which has drawn a red line around 
nuclear proliferation, is too vital 
to our own and global security to 
take it for granted or fail to act to 
reduce its vulnerability.” 
While the word “crisis” was 
often used to describe the state 
of play over the NPT, many 
other participants warned against 
considering this a crisis since—as 
a negotiating tactic—it suggests 
that states will be willing to 
compromise too much in the 
name of a Review Conference 
consensus or that the Treaty is in 
its terminal stages. Amb. Bonnier 
asked, “Is it wise to say that the 
NPT is in a crisis? Some believe 
that projecting a sense of crisis 
around the NPT and to do so 
year after year might induce some 
governments to take action when 
otherwise they would not…. I 
am afraid that others will rather 
take the crisis calls as indications 
that the NPT is no longer good 
enough, no longer worth the 
effort and no longer a viable road 
ahead.” The Consultation would 
make “a real contribution” if it 
were to focus “on what it takes 
to prevent a crisis.”
The U.N. Under-Secretary-
General for Disarmament, 
Hon. Nobuyasu Abe did see the 
situation as a crisis. “I think we 




I think we all know that the NPT is 
facing a crisis. Some say it is on the 
verge of collapse. Some others say it 
is increasingly losing its relevance. 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director-
General of the IAEA, said the NPT 
is facing a “major challenge.” The 
Secretary-General’s High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change has in its recent report warned that we are “approaching 
a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could 
become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” Expressions 
may vary but it is an undeniable fact that unless the NPT succeeds in 
regaining its relevance at the coming Review Conference in May, its 
foundation may be further eroded. 
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, as its name shows, aims at 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a corollary, it also 
has the objective of promoting nuclear disarmament. If the Treaty fails 
to achieve these objectives, one may come to question the value of 
maintaining the Treaty…
Given the urgency of the situation I hope the relevant entities such as 
the NPT Review Conference, IAEA Board of Governors, the Security 
Council and the Conference on Disarmament take urgent action on 
them. We need what I may call an urgent action plan to stop the erosion 
of the NPT, arrest nuclear proliferation and promote disarmament. 
The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel and his Advisory Board on 
Disarmament Matters have offered a blueprint for such a plan, and I 
encourage you all to consider its recommendations seriously. I know 
many participants of those forums are aware of the urgency but it 
seems the rigid rules of procedure that require consensus agreement on 
almost everything prevent them from achieving the desired results. I 
would urge them to try even harder testing the limits of their consensus 
rules. In anticipation of the high-level summit at the United Nations 
this September, and during this 35th anniversary year for the NPT, 
the Secretary-General for his part plans to challenge the international 
community to think and act more boldly to reinvigorate the nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 
Otherwise, if we fail to act in a meaningful way, there may be an 
increasing tendency that like-minded countries come to work together 
to take actions to supplement or to build on the existing nuclear 
non-proliferation regime centered around the NPT, and that may be 
ultimately the way we may have to look to, an NPT Plus.
crisis,” he said. “Some say it is on the verge of collapse.… It is an undeniable fact that unless the NPT 
succeeds in regaining its relevance at the coming Review Conference in May, its foundation may be 
further eroded.”
This erosion in the non-proliferation regime has led to seven “gaps,” according to Mr. Abe. The gaps 
are: (1) nuclear states that remain outside the NPT; (2) the “new and quite disturbing phenomenon” 
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of withdrawal from the Treaty; (3) the veriﬁ cation gap in which there are still countries that have not 
signed the Additional Protocol; (4) a “nuclear fuel cycle gap” under which “countries can go very 
close to having nuclear weapon production capability without breaking the existing non-proliferation 
rules;” (5) the possibility of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction; (6) the “enforcement 
gap” meaning the lack of capacity to take action against a country violating the NPT; and (7) lack of 
progress on disarmament.
AMBASSADOR SERGIO DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE OF THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
The future of the NPT has been put in doubt by some commentators over the past few months. There are 
several reasons for discouragement: the announcement of withdrawal by one of the parties, accusations of 
lack of compliance by another, disclosure of a secret nuclear program by yet another, and complacency about 
the de facto nuclear status of three non-parties; last, but certainly not least, a general sense of lack of interest 
by the nuclear-weapon parties to pursue vigorously their commitments to nuclear disarmament. 
What we have to contend with at the 2005 Review Conference is a persistent and serious situation of erosion 
of conﬁ dence in the mechanisms of the NPT and on the ability of the instrument to survive the tests it has 
been put through. We could say there is a “conﬁ dence gap” in the NPT. This state of affairs seems to have 
grown more complex since the indeﬁ nite extension in 1995, despite what was perceived as an important step 
forward in 2000. Many feel that its Parties lack the necessary will to confront that situation squarely and 
agree on effective means to avert further dangers…
I believe it goes without saying that by being party to the NPT almost the entirety of the world community 
and has a vital stake in its permanence and validity. Trust in the full implementation of its promises was the 
primary reason for the massive support it came to enjoy. In order to preserve and strengthen the Treaty it 
seems imperative to renew and enhance this trust at the 2005 Review Conference. 
If previous commitments made by states party are regarded as mere symbolic gestures conﬁ dence on the 
effectiveness of the Treaty will certainly erode. Despite what many would consider as serious shortcomings, 
all parties have a stake in the permanence and durability of the NPT, and thus have a duty to work actively 
towards full compliance with all provisions of the Treaty…
Despite alarming signs of frustration with the NPT and recent doubts about its relevance to deal with old and 
new threats, I am convinced that the success of the forthcoming 2005 Conference rests on the will of parties 
to work toward the central objectives of the Treaty, thus reinforcing its relevance and credibility. 
The NPT must continue to be a 
necessary element of the international 
framework to maintain peace and 
security for all. Rather than reiterating 
confrontational positions or to seek 
gaining selective advantages at 
the 2005 Review Conference, all 
parties should strive together to 
advance a common agenda based on 
the essential bargain that made the 
Treaty possible. I intend to devote 
my efforts from now until the end 
of the Review Conference to help the 
realization of this goal.
Sen. Douglas Roche, Amb. Sergio Duarte, Ilmi Granoff, and Mrs. Carter.
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THE ISSUES AND NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES
In the ﬁ nal months leading up to the Review Conference, the President-designate of the Review 
Conference, Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, said his focus has been on settling 
procedural questions, in particular agreement on an agenda. “Lack of an agreed agenda may block the 
work of the Conference and precipitate a long and fruitless discussion, preventing meaningful debate 
on the substantive issues,” he warned.
On those substantive issues, he said some of “the major items of interest” are:
• “The reafﬁ rmation of the commitment to nuclear disarmament under Article VI … has been 
stressed as a major objective by non-nuclear weapon parties,” along with the “related question” of 
“measures to increase accountability and transparency, particularly regarding nuclear arsenals.”
• “There is an obvious need to ensure that the safeguards and veriﬁ cation system provided for in 
Article III works effectively to satisfy parties that obligations set forth in Articles I and II are being 
fully complied with; at the same time, however, many have pointed out that the application of that 
system should not contradict the right to develop research and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, as established in Article IV.” 
• “Many parties have stated the view that it is imperative to break the paralysis of the Conference [on 
Disarmament]. The negotiation of an FMCT still seems to be the best possible opportunity, if the 
remaining divergences can be bridged.”
• “The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty is seen by the overwhelming majority 
of parties as an essential step towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.” 
• “Non-nuclear parties have consistently stressed that [the] nuclear non-proliferation regime would 
be greatly strengthened by the adoption of effective, legally binding agreements on negative security 
assurances.”
• “The new and serious challenges to international peace and security, which arose as a consequence 
of the emergence of terrorism as a tool of political extremism, must also be ﬁ rmly addressed at the 
forthcoming Review Conference. Although speciﬁ cally dealing with states, not individuals, the 
NPT has an important role to play in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by so-called 
non-state actors…. The reduction and eventual elimination of the threat posed by international 
terrorism, however, cannot be achieved solely through the NPT. Other tools and mechanisms exist, 
and some have already been put in motion.”
• “Regional security issues, particularly those relating to the Middle East, once again will represent an 
important part of deliberations at the Review Conference. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
states not party to the NPT also raises serious concerns. Many parties believe that there should be no 
rewards for those who remain outside the regime. This question is closely linked to the perception, 
apparently held by some, that the indeﬁ nite possession of nuclear weapons was somehow legitimized 
for those states recognized as such in the NPT, a view that non-nuclear parties strongly reject.” 
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Conference ready to match the U.S. hard-line with a hard-line of their own, or come with a balanced 
agenda that would be a counterpoint to the United States, the two diplomats favored the latter approach. 
Mr. Goosen said, “An approach at the 2005 Review Conference which focuses on the implementable 
and the achievable, which does not attempt to reinterpret, negate or withdraw from existing obligations, 
commitments and undertakings, and which maintains the balance of the NPT Treaty Regime bargains 




In 2005, contradictory forces will confront the Review Conference. 
While attempting to deal with the current political realities, it will 
need to work to restore the 1965 principle of a “…balance of mutual 
obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.” It will be challenged 
to balance the dissatisfaction at the lack of progress and reversals on the 
agreed nuclear disarmament measures with non-proliferation concerns 
that have been exacerbated by the role of non-state actors. It will need 
to balance calls for the implementation of the nuclear disarmament 
obligations, commitments and undertakings with calls for additional 
non-proliferation measures as well as further restrictions on the right 
to utilize nuclear science for peaceful purposes.
In doing this “balancing act,” the Review Conference will furthermore be 
required to ensure that any attempts to reinterpret, negate or withdraw 
from Treaty Regime obligations, commitments and undertakings, 
including those made in 1995 and 2000, are not successful. The 
Conference will need to make the proponents of such positions 
understand that they may not only be satisfying an immediate national 
objective, but that they may in the process be laying the foundation 
for undermining the entire package of bargains that make up the NPT 
Treaty Regime. Such approaches may also set challenges for 2005 that 
the Review Conference will not be able to meet…
An approach at the 2005 Review Conference which focuses on 
the implementable and the achievable, which does not attempt to 
reinterpret, negate or withdraw from existing obligations, commitments 
and undertakings, and which maintains the balance of the NPT Treaty 
Regime bargains will allow the 2005 Review Conference to meet the 
core NPT challenges ﬂ owing from 1995 and 2000.
The diplomats who will be 
involved in the deliberations at 
the Review Conference described 
what they felt should be the 
strategies and priorities of the 
New Agenda Coalition and 
other non-nuclear weapon states, 
and again the emphasis was on 
balance and bargain. 
“At their core,” said Mr. Peter 
Goosen of the South African 
foreign ministry, “the Treaty 
regime and the NPT, its extension 
and its Reviews are bargains—
bargains that contained a balance 
of obligations, commitments or 
undertakings that need to be 
implemented in all their aspects.” 
Amb. Bonnier also emphasized 
balancing all the commitments. 
“We sometimes hear the view 
that since the Review Conference 
of 1995 was about the Treaty’s 
extension, and the Review 
Conference of 2000 focused on 
disarmament, the 2005 Review 
Conference should focus on 
curbing proliferation,” she said. 
“I for my part believe that it is 
necessary to focus on key issues 
in all of the three dimensions of 
the Treaty. Progress on only one 
front will not effectively uphold 
the NPT as a whole.”
As to the debate over whether 
middle power governments 
should come to the Review 
Amb. Sergio Duarte, Mr. Peter Goosen, Sen. Douglas Roche, Amb. Robert 
Grey, and Dr. David Krieger
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DR. JANE GOODALL, D.B.E.
U.N. MESSENGER FOR PEACE
I’ve always been fascinated 
from the beginning by human 
aggression. I think that stems 
back to my own childhood. 
I don’t remember World War II 
awfully well. I wasn’t very old 
when it began. I was only ﬁ ve. I 
distinctly remember even though 
we were safe—we were on the 
South coast of England away 
from most of the bombing—but 
bombs fell, they cracked our 
windows. We knew people who 
died in the ﬁ ghting in Europe. 
And then came the terrible 
revelations of the Holocaust, and 
those pictures made a deep impression on me… 
And then came Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And those two events were too hard for a child to even contemplate. 
It didn’t seem to be making sense, that a bomb was dropped, the same kind of bomb, as far as we knew that 
was dropped all the time on innocent civilians. But this bomb, these bombs, these atom bombs were capable 
of such terrible destruction. We read about people who just were standing there and then suddenly they were 
gone. And it wasn’t making any sense. And I think what children do when things don’t make sense, they push 
it away. And a lot of us never grow up. And we don’t like to think about things that don’t make sense…
When I began to realize that chimpanzees showed similar signs of aggressive patterns as us, I began to wonder 
if perhaps understanding aggression in chimpanzees might help me to understand how we got ourselves 
into the kind of situation that I kept seeing. All these wars around the world, the violence, the murders, the 
crime, the hate.
Chimps show many postures and gestures in aggressive context, which are virtually the same as ours: shaking 
their ﬁ sts, throwing rocks, waving branches, swaggering. And they show aggression in the same kind of context 
that we show them in, such as protecting females, protecting resources, such as ﬁ ghting for dominance. It 
seemed to me that they sometimes ﬁ ght and try to get high status, just to attain power. And that perhaps 
the only other creature except ourselves for whom power is important for itself is the chimpanzee and maybe 
the other great apes. And it was pretty shocking to learn that these beings who I thought were so like us, but 
rather nicer, in certain situations could show brutality. 
They too had a dark side…
... I kept meeting young people who seemed to have lost hope. Young people who were depressed, and in 
some cases they were almost suicidal. Some of them were angry and bitter … Basically they were all saying 
the same thing. ‘We feel this way because we think you’ve compromised our future.’ 
And we have… When I look at my grandchildren and I think of how much we’ve harmed this planet since 
I was their age, I feel deep shame and pain…
My reasons for hope for the future are the human brain and what we can do with it and have done with it, 
for so much good. And unfortunately there is that part which, I think, gets divorced from the human heart, 
and leads to things like weapons of mass destruction and some of the other horrors of modern technology. 
But the human brain, which has created these monsters, is capable of overcoming them. 
Matthew Hodes, Jonathan Granoff, Hon. Marian Hobbs, and Dr. Jane Goodall
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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
Judging from past Conferences, there will be more than 100 states party to the NPT represented at 
the Review Conference. But it is clear that the focus of attention will be the negotiating position of 
the United States. The Preparatory Committee meetings saw little progress, largely because the United 
States (and France) would not agree to an agenda for the Review Conference that makes reference 
to the 13 Practical Steps. With a stalemate on a procedural matter, there was no hope of progress on 
substantive issues. 
While he referred to all the nuclear powers in his analysis, President Carter centered his criticism on 
the U.S. government. “The United States claims to be upholding Article VI,” he said, “but yet asserts a 
security strategy of testing and developing new weapons—Star Wars and the earth-penetrating ‘bunker 
buster’—and has threatened ﬁ rst use, even against non-nuclear states, in case of ‘surprising military 
developments’ and ‘unexpected contingencies.’” 
He then proposed a series of “corrective actions” the United States and other nuclear weapon states need 
to take: (a) the U.S. needs to address unresolved issues from the Moscow Treaty, including applying 
principles of transparency, veriﬁ cation and irreversibility to the treaty, and pledging to dismantle 
decommissioned weapons; (b) all nuclear weapon states should make a “no ﬁ rst use” pledge; (c) “the 
United States needs to de-emphasize the role of its nuclear weapons in NATO and possibly consider 
an end to their deployment in Western Europe;” (d) the United States and Russia should take their 
weapons off hair-trigger alert; (e) the United States “needs to return” to the CTBT although it is 
“unfortunately moving in the opposite direction”; (f ) the United States should take the lead in the 
creation of a ﬁ ssile materials treaty; (g) the ballistic missile defense program should end since “this failed 
experiment has broken its commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty without replacing it with 
a working substitute;” and (h) the United States should pay greater attention to “perhaps the world’s 
greatest proliferation threat” of Russia’s unsecured stockpiles. 
Congressman John Spratt (Democrat from South Carolina) argued that it is in the self-interest of 
the United States to support the Treaty. “The NPT has enjoyed far more success than failure, and it 
provides some clear advantages for the United States,” he said. “First, the NPT marshals the world 
against nuclear weapons with a collective force that we could not muster on our own, and it provides 
a framework and forum for dealing with proliferation problems. The United States needs not just 
non-proliferation programs; we need non-proliferation partners, and the NPT helps supply that need. 
Second, when cheating occurs, or non-compliance is found, the NPT confers what Koﬁ  Annan calls 
the ‘unique legitimacy of the United Nations’ on the steps that have to be taken. If the U.S. acts under 
the auspices of the NPT, the U.S. does not have to take unilateral, pre-emptive action.” 
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
One of the most obvious differences of opinion concerned how to balance rights of states party to the 
NPT to have nuclear technology while addressing the proliferation threat posed by the development of 
such technology. Rep. Spratt called the ability of a state to develop a nuclear weapons program under the 
guise of a civilian power program “a loophole, a ﬂ aw in the fabric of the NPT.” He argued that North 
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Korea and Iran—“two devious 
states”—have shown how “states 
that set out to circumvent the 
NPT’s ban on the production 
of nuclear weapons can exploit 
the right to build a nuclear 
power plant. While seeming 
to remain within the terms of 
the Treaty, they can gather the 
resources necessary to make 
nuclear weapons.”
“This ‘closed fuel cycle’ allows 
these states the capacity to 
produce the ﬁ ssile materials, the 
sine qua non of nuclear weapons,” 
he said. “Facilities used to enrich 
uranium for power reactors can 
be used to enrich uranium for 
weapons, and facilities used to 
reprocess spent fuel can process 
weapons-grade plutonium.” 
Rep. Spratt endorsed a plan 
that would create a “parallel 
agreement” to the NPT that 
apparently would go further 
than the Additional Protocol in 
controlling what a country does 
with nuclear technology. Under 
this proposal, he said, “States 
that do sell nuclear technology 
or reactor fuel would agree not 
to sell any fuel or equipment 
or technology to any country 
that does not forgo the right to 
enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel. 
At the same time, those same 
countries would guarantee the 
reliable supply of nuclear fuel 
and the retrieval of spent fuel at 
competitive, perhaps subsidized 
prices, to countries consenting to 
this new arrangement.” Countries 
that would resist the agreement 
might “have no choice if the 
supplier nations form a phalanx 
CONGRESSMAN JOHN SPRATT
UNITED STATES
To pick up where the last treaty 
review left off, and propose a 
quid pro quo to which the non-
nuclear parties would respond [to 
a proposal for tighter controls on 
the nuclear fuel cycle], the Senate 
could ratify the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, but I seriously 
doubt that ratiﬁ cation is within 
the art of the possible, at least not 
now. Ratification for a limited 
time, or ratiﬁ cation subject to the right to withdraw, is an alternative, 
but probably not a viable one in the Senate today. The tragedy of the 
last vote on ratiﬁ cation was not just that the vote was lost; but that the 
argument was lost as a result of pushing for a vote before being ready. 
It would be a mistake to push for another vote and lose it too…
The testing moratorium remains in place, and the Bush Administration 
insists that it has no plans at present to resume testing, but the Nuclear 
Posture Review leaves that door wide open…
Shortening the lead-time to testing is one of a handful of initiatives 
which have a “plausible military rationale,” but which result in a net 
negative for the United States in the world. They suggest that United 
States is trying to move the world in one direction, away from nuclear 
weapons, while we move in another. 
We do not realize a net gain, for example, by repealing “Spratt-Furse”—
the ban on development of low-yield nuclear weapons. The world’s 
greatest conventional power does not need to use nuclear weapons in 
a conﬂ ict for tactical purposes, and should not give credence to the 
notion that small nuclear weapons have tactical utility. 
We do not realize a net gain by developing a new earth-penetrating 
nuclear warhead, designed to destroy deep-underground bunkers, even 
though these may be enclaves for weapons of mass destruction. 
We do not realize a net gain by leaving the impression that we regard 
nuclear weapons as differing in degree but not in kind from conventional 
weapons.
We do not realize a net gain by investing in “advanced concepts,” 
suggesting that the U.S. is about to develop a new generation of nuclear 
weapons.
Having opposed all of these measures, I would say, nonetheless, that 
they are not as substantive as one might infer. In repealing Spratt-
Furse, Congress reminded the Pentagon that funding for any low-yield 
nuclear weapon must be authorized before it is developed; and in 2004, 
Congress did just that, by refusing appropriations for the robust earth 
penetrator and advanced nuclear concepts. There are other pluses, such 
as SORT, that combine to make our current posture a net positive.
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and refuse to sell non-complying countries fuel or technology,” he added. 
“The fuel cycle loophole is not a recent discovery,” Rep. Spratt said. “The issue has been addressed three 
times in past years, but never resolved because the stakeholders have never reached consensus. But with 
Iranians and North Koreans both exploiting the Treaty, the issue is no longer hypothetical.”
However, Mr. Goosen warned against any moves that would hinder nations’ rights to nuclear technology 
as “disturb[ing] the balance of the NPT bargains.” It will be “a challenge” at the Review Conference “to 
guard against unacceptable inroads into the inalienable right of states party to veriﬁ ably utilize nuclear 
science for peaceful purposes,” he said. “There is a growing concern that demands for non-nuclear 
weapon states to agree to increasing restrictions on their ability to utilize nuclear science in the name of 
non-proliferation [are] not being balanced by a reciprocal approach towards nuclear disarmament.”
Other key actors have put forward far-reaching proposals to control the spread of uranium enrichment 
and plutonium reprocessing technology. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei calls for “working 
towards multilateral control over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle—enrichment, reprocessing, 
and the management and disposal of spent fuel.” The U.N. Secretary-General’s High-level Panel 
recommended a combination of voluntary action and multilateral control. It called for states to forgo 
for a limited period construction of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, with ﬁ ssile materials supplied 
at current market prices, while an arrangement is negotiated for the IAEA to act as a guarantor for 
the supply of ﬁ ssile materials for non-military use. President Bush proposed that exporting countries 
deny the technology to additional states. The G-8 responded to this proposal by declaring a one-year 
moratorium on supply to non-possessing states, but the far larger Nuclear Suppliers Group has yet to 
take any action. 
A less sweeping but still signiﬁ cant proposal is that adherence to the Additional Protocol on Safeguards 
should become a universal standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations and treatment 
as a member in good standing of the NPT with access to nuclear fuel.
As discussions at the consultation reﬂ ected, the matter is extremely sensitive. Non-nuclear weapon 
states regard access to such technology as their right under Article IV of the NPT, and further resent 
what they regard as the implication that developing countries are not to be trusted with technology 
possessed by some developed states. However, as the 1946 U.S.-proposed “Baruch Plan” illustrates, it 
was understood from the beginning of the nuclear age that the spread of nuclear technology, especially 
the means of producing fuel for nuclear reactors, would also provide the foundation for nuclear weapons 
programs. For reasons of effectiveness, legitimacy, and promotion of global norms generally, states should 
seriously consider proposals for multilateral controls. Elevation of the role of the Additional Protocol is 
also desirable. This may be a unique opportunity to establish greater levels of international cooperation 
in setting a higher universal norm in controlling dangerous ﬁ ssile materials.
THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Middle Eastern countries represented at the Consultation reminded the participants that, just as 
the 13 Practical Steps are still valid, so too is the 1995 decision on the Middle East. Mr. Alaa Issa of 
ATLANTA CONSULTATION II: ON THE FUTURE OF THE NPT   •   FINAL REPORT  14
the Egyptian foreign ministry stressed that the decision to extend the NPT in 1995 came in the form 
of a package in which the extension was agreed to in exchange for other commitments, including the 
resolution on the Middle East. “The decision on principles and objectives was a necessary element for the 
indeﬁ nite extension, and the decision on the indeﬁ nite extension in turn could not have been adopted 
in its ﬁ nal form if there had been no agreement on the resolution on the Middle East,” he said.
In a written statement read to the Consultation, Mr. Issa said, “We are in reality no closer than we were 
in 2000 with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, extension of full-scope safeguards to Israel’s nuclear 
facilities, or establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, all of them objectives and 
priorities that were pronounced in 1995 and 2000.” He added, “The most critical outstanding element 
that will be before the 2005 Review Conference relates to the lack of progress by Israel in acceding to 
the NPT and placing its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards…. The margin for maneuver 
with regard to substance is slim while the political challenges are signiﬁ cant.”
Ambassador Rajab Sukayri of Jordan said Israel’s nuclear arsenal was forcing other countries in the 
Middle East to consider “indulging” in nuclear programs of their own. The danger in preserving the 
status quo was that it would help perpetuate and legitimize Israel’s nuclear stockpile, he added. President 
Carter said that both Iran and Israel need to be pressured to comply with non-proliferation restraints. 
Citing Iran’s enrichment program, he said it “remains a primary example of the need to ban highly 
enriched uranium for any purpose.” 
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
DR. TADATOSHI AKIBA
MAYOR OF HIROSHIMA
It is ﬁ tting that this consultation is occurring in the United States. As 
diplomats you are expected to deal with the governments ‘you are dealt.’ 
It is considered bad form to try to go around a government and appeal 
directly to its people. We could debate the merits of this custom, but 
I would like to suggest that when one nation spends more money on 
so-called security than the rest of the world combined and brazenly 
sweeps aside decades of carefully crafted international law, it becomes 
politically suicidal not to take advantage of that nation’s primary saving 
grace: democratic debate.
Yet witness the sterility of the nuclear debate in the last presidential 
election. The two main candidates vied over who would do a better 
job of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. Fine, but 
why did neither have anything to say about removing nuclear weapons 
from everyone’s hands, including those who already have them? Until 
such questions are asked and thoroughly debated in a U.S. presidential 
election, what chance is there of making sustained progress on balanced 
fulﬁ llment of the NPT? We must resolve to do whatever we can outside 
and inside the United States to ensure that another election does not 
go by in which the American people do not come to grips with their 
profound responsibility to play a positive, if not leading role, in the 
achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world.
S i n c e  t h e  2 0 0 0  Re v i e w 
Conference gave the Conference 
on Disarmament (C.D.) two 
tasks, the failure of the Conference 
to make any progress was also 
a topic of discussion at the 
Consultation. Amb. Meyer said, 
“If the C.D. [were] a business 
it would have gone bankrupt 
long ago…. For those who are 
concerned with the future of the 
NPT let me remind you that the 
bankruptcy of the C.D. threatens 
the solvency of the NPT. The 
NPT Review Conference of 
2000 entrusted to the C.D. 
two priority tasks: the initiation 
of negotiations on a non-
discriminatory and effectively 
veriﬁ able ﬁ ssile materials cut-off 
treaty and the establishment of 
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HON. MARIAN HOBBS
NEW ZEALAND MINISTER FOR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
The imperfections in the NPT have been much discussed in recent times. A timetable for nuclear disarmament 
was never stipulated and no veriﬁ cation provisions for disarmament were included. The Treaty is not universal: 
some states—most notably India, Pakistan, and Israel—did not sign on to the NPT. This meant that they 
were not constrained by its provisions when they subsequently developed their own nuclear weapons. And 
there is no agreed mechanism to sanction a nation that signs against nuclear weapons but does develop them, 
or a nation that develops new nuclear weapons.
The disarmament provisions of the NPT are clear, despite the lack of timetable. “Each of the Parties to the 
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the race 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.” The intent, to which all countries agreed in 1970, is unambiguous, 
so why is progress towards this goal painfully slow?
The reality is that no state wants to give up its nuclear weapons. Despite all the risks, countries that possess 
nuclear weapons, most of which also have huge and sophisticated conventional arsenals, remain loathe to part 
with them. The changed security dynamic after September 11 2001 has resulted in an environment where 
countries do not want to be denied any potential security advantage. Unfortunately, for some countries, this has 
been construed as justiﬁ cation for the continued retention, even embellishment, of their nuclear arsenals.
However, the inescapable logical consequence of states retaining their nuclear weapons for ‘security’ is that 
it serves as a constant impetus to other states to acquire nuclear weapons for these same perceived security 
beneﬁ ts. It also means that the nuclear materials and technology required for weaponry remain in a constant 
state of renewal and refurbishment, perpetuating proliferation risks. It is, in short, ultimately self-defeating 
for all of us on this planet. It is the antithesis of security.
The only reasonable approach to this problem is that disarmament measures must take place within a series 
of transparent, veriﬁ able, parallel steps. This process must occur in tandem with non-proliferation measures. 
Nuclear weapons serve no constructive purpose in our world: we must work together to eliminate them (and 
the potential for their creation) for the beneﬁ t of everyone.
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an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The C.D. has, ﬁ ve years later, failed 
completely to realize these taskings.” He said Canada would be open to alternatives to the C.D. for 
accomplishing those goals. 
In a message read to the Consultation from Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba of Hiroshima, Dr. Akiba proposed 
that the Conference set up a subsidiary body of the NPT. “The C.D. must be given a deadline for the 
commencement of work on a program of action for nuclear disarmament,” he said. If the deadline 
passes, the review conference must set up such a body. Dr. Akiba, who is also the president of Mayors 
for Peace, said Mayors for Peace intends to have a delegation “one hundred strong” at the opening of 
the Review Conference. “The world cannot allow proliferation and disarmament to fester for another 
ﬁ ve years,” he wrote. However, he was concerned that not all parties will be coming to the conference 
“with the commensurate good faith.” Therefore, “if the bad faith of others dooms your best efforts, you 
have a political obligation, underscored by the World Court, to ﬁ nd another way forward. Without an 
alternative course of action, failure would indeed be complete.” 
Amb. Bonnier sympathized with the sentiment, but disagreed with that course of action. “We are all 
frustrated by the slow pace of progress, in some cases even backsliding,” she said. “It might be tempting 
to try other avenues. But I believe that we must stubbornly stay the course. Looking for alternatives to 
the NPT-track will most certainly mean the end of the NPT.”
AMBASSADOR ELISABET BORSIIN BONNIER
SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT
There are serious problems in all the three pillars of the NPT. Proliferation has happened. Clandestine weapons 
programs have been pursued. Nuclear weapons are still abundant and are still being developed and reﬁ ned. 
And the beneﬁ ts of peaceful uses of nuclear energy are often not readily available to all. Just as the three pillars 
were meant to reinforce one another, so do their respective problems tend to reinforce each other.
Furthermore, I believe that it is a fundamental mistake to approach the issues at hand, as we so often have 
done, along the lines of the traditional geo-political groupings be it east-west, north-south or otherwise. In 
the New Agenda Coalition we have tried to cut across this, and I believe we would all be much better off if 
we could rally around the NPT 
from a common security 
perspective, other differences 
notwithstanding. At the 
last General Assembly, the 
New Agenda made a special 
effort to reach out beyond 
various groupings. We are 
grateful that some NATO 
members and U.S. allies 
took our outstretched hands 
in spite of U.S. demarches 
in capitals ... The true fault 
lines are between those who 
conscientiously try to live up 
to their commitments, and 
those who don’t; between those 
who seek to preserve or acquire 
nuclear weapons, and those 
who don’t.
Amb. László Molnár and Amb. Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier
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BREAKOUT SESSION REPORTS
THE CTBT AND THE TESTING MORATORIUM
The presenters at this session both stressed the fact that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) was fundamental to the 1995 NPT extension agreement, and thus will be central 
to the debate in this year’s Review Conference.
Mr. Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, explained that the CTBT is “the 
longest-sought and hardest-fought objective in the ﬁ eld of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.” 
While it is important for delegates to the Review Conference to maintain pressure on the non-signatory 
countries, much more needs to be done in Washington. Mr. Kimball focused on four problems. First, 
he drew attention to the necessity of maintaining the U.S. test moratorium and explained that only 
the Senate—not the President—has authority to discharge the treaty from the executive calendar, 
and that a majority vote would be required to do so, which is unlikely. Second, he cited the need to 
block U.S. research and development on modiﬁ ed or new nuclear warheads. The Bush administration 
had only narrowly won approval for work on such warheads on the assertion that they only want to 
conduct research, and the last Congress funded no work on earth penetrators. Third, he highlighted the 
importance of supporting the CTBT Organization because of the CTBTO’s vulnerability to possible 
U.S. budget cuts. Finally, he drew attention to the imperative of improving monitoring and transparency 
measures to detect clandestine testing. Additional test site transparency initiatives could address future 
uncertainties and clear up erroneous allegations.
Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, special representative for the promotion of the ratiﬁ cation of the CTBT, 
said his work will continue with planned trips to China, Indonesia, and India. It would be important 
to convey to states that have not signed the CTBT that others consider it to be a vital part of a 
comprehensive approach to global security. The CTBT has been ratiﬁ ed by the entire European Union 
(including the newer eastern European countries); all NATO members except the U.S.; and three out 
of ﬁ ve permanent members of the Security Council. The Canadian idea of holding conferences to 
discuss the CTBT was appropriate, especially in light of regional concerns over non-signatories such 
as Pakistan, India, and China. 
A principal theme of the discussion was the lack of political energy and international will surrounding 
the CTBT ratiﬁ cation process. Amb. Ramaker said that since “the CTBT will never enter into force 
without a change in the position of the United States,” it is important to continue to strengthen the 
CTBT with the understanding that it will likely be done without U.S. support in the near term.
Participants also noted the importance of supporting the CTBTO. Each signatory should provide 
adequate ﬁ nancial, political, and technical support for the continued development of the CTBTO, 
thereby supporting the International Data Center, the International Monitoring System, and the 
Executive Secretariat.
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DE-ALERTING
Dr. Bruce Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information, said that de-alerting would be one of 
the most powerful messages nuclear weapon states could send to the world to validate their Article VI 
commitment. It would also demonstrate commitment to the 13 Practical Steps. He deﬁ ned de-alerting 
as reducing readiness of launch, a practical step that is necessary in the disarmament process. 
Dr. Blair discussed the dangers and the reality of hair-trigger alert, outlining the frighteningly short 
time-line between receiving warning of a possible incoming nuclear missile attack and making a decision 
whether to retaliate. De-alerting would help alleviate risks associated with mistakes, possible coups in 
nuclear weapon states, false warnings, unauthorized launches, computer hacking into command and 
control systems, and other unforeseen circumstances—”all with apocalyptic consequences.”
Dr. Blair also said that “the Nunn-Lugar program cannot succeed unless the United States and Russia 
stand down their nuclear arsenals and take them off alert [since] the requirements for nuclear war 
ﬁ ghting… inevitably keep U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals in perpetual motion. You cannot lock them 
down a la Nunn-Lugar unless you opt out of the game of hair-trigger nuclear postures.” Furthermore, 
hair-trigger status increases the risk of terrorist theft or accident during transportation. He also pointed 
out that NATO nuclear weapons were de-alerted in the 1990s. 
Mr. Bülent Meriç of the Turkish foreign ministry placed de-alerting in the context of the overall 
security environment of the Middle East. He emphasized the value of deterrence and the need for 
changing the security environment in the region. He voiced concern regarding security threats that 
have been heightened in the region, including Israeli nuclear capacity, Syrian C-systems and Iranian 
“improvements” to missiles. 
A key strategy proposal arising from the session was that middle power governments should press the 
United States and Russia to implement rapid de-alerting, culminating in a global stand-down—that is, 
separated warheads from delivery vehicles—before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The 2005 Review 
Conference should support this. Other proposals included: (a) educating the public on the reality of 
hair-trigger alert, the contingency planning for all-out nuclear war, and the risks posed by such planning 
and operational status, including terrorist risks, and (b) an appeal to be supported by MPI and to be 
signed by experts, parliamentarians, and Nobel Laureates, including President Carter.
FISSILE MATERIALS TREATY & NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
Dr. Frank von Hippel of Princeton University said controlling ﬁ ssile materials was central to several of 
the commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference: a ﬁ ssile materials treaty, transparency in 
nuclear weapons capabilities, and the implication that ﬁ ssile materials stocks would be disposed as part 
of a process of applying irreversibility to disarmament. He said the NPT already controls ﬁ ssile materials 
production by non-nuclear weapon states, “so the question is why you cannot move that regime over 
to the nuclear weapon states.”
Mr. Johan Rautenbach, Director of the Ofﬁ ce of Legal Affairs of the IAEA, said 90 states have signed 
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the Additional Protocol, with 62 states having the Protocol in force. He said “old assumptions” about 
ﬁ ssile materials—in particular the belief that access to relevant technologies is limited and that this is 
an issue involving only states—have to be replaced by new policies to strengthen control of the nuclear 
fuel cycle. Mr. Rautenbach listed four elements for such a strategy: (a) strengthen the application of 
safeguards, (b) limit weapons-usable materials, (c) enhance the security of the nuclear fuel cycle, and 
(d) develop a proliferation resistant nuclear fuel cycle. 
Both presenters supported Dr. ElBaradei’s proposal that reprocessing and enrichment work be limited 
to sites under multilateral control and that there be a ﬁ ve-year moratorium on the construction of 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities. There was some opposition to the idea of multilateral controls 
since such a move would infringe on the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy guaranteed under the 
NPT. Mr. Rautenbach said such a policy was not aimed at denying states nuclear technology, but rather 
was “just a measure to remove some possibility of proliferation.”
Several participants discussed the July 2004 statement by the United States that it could not accept a 
veriﬁ cation provision in a ﬁ ssile materials treaty because it had no conﬁ dence that veriﬁ cation could 
work. Dr. von Hippel said, “This is an absurd statement,” explaining that the declared fuel production 
facilities in nuclear weapon states can be inspected just as such facilities are in non-nuclear weapon states 
under safeguards agreement. He believed the real issue was that the U.S. fears the potential intrusiveness 
of inspections that might attempt to go beyond declared facilities. As a way to move the debate forward, 
he suggested a two-stage process in which only declared facilities would be inspected, but still “leave the 
door open” to applying an Additional Protocol type approach to the nuclear weapons states. However, 
he cautioned, “You can’t in the long term have two veriﬁ cation regimes.” 
Several options for further actions were raised, including: (a) continuing political pressure for a 
commitment to begin ﬁ ssile materials negotiations as agreed to in 1995 and 2000; (b) encourage the 
United States to withdraw its opposition to veriﬁ cation of a ﬁ ssile materials treaty and at the same time 
encourage the creation of a technical advisory panel to study the validity of veriﬁ cation concerns; and 
(c) broad support for the ElBaradei proposals. 
NON-PROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ISSUES
The session focused primarily on northeast Asia and the Middle East.
Ambassador Takeshi Nakane of the Japanese foreign ministry said there is an urgent need for North 
Korea to undertake transparent disarmament and veriﬁ cation measures in cooperation with the IAEA. 
He emphasized the importance for Japan of supporting the six-party talks on North Korea. He said Japan 
wants to strengthen the Additional Protocol, particularly in light of the revelation of an underground 
nuclear network. 
Ambassador Rajab Sukayri of Jordan emphasized that all states in the Middle East, except Israel, are in 
full compliance with the NPT, and that therefore a regional non-proliferation regime would necessarily 
fail until universality was achieved. The danger in preserving the status quo is that it perpetuates and 
legitimizes Israel’s nuclear stockpile. He said Israel’s arsenal of between 200-300 weapons is likely inciting 
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other countries in the Middle East to consider developing nuclear programs. While Libya’s recent efforts 
to rid itself of its nuclear development program and accord the IAEA inspectors access are laudable, such 
progress needs to be considered in the regional context of Iran’s controversial activities in the nuclear 
arena. He endorsed the creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and of a 
regional non-proliferation regime that would be predicated on an as-yet-undeveloped Arab peace plan 
that would address Arab and Israeli concerns. 
Mr. Werner Bauwens from Belgium’s Disarmament and Arms Control Division focused on the European 
Union’s response to Iran, emphasizing that Iran would be a key issue at the NPT Review Conference. 
While Iran’s development of centrifuges and its investment of a signiﬁ cant portion of its budget in a secret 
nuclear program were grounds for great concern, he said the fact that Iran had recently committed to 
full-ﬂ edged consultations with the IAEA and talks with the European Union were reasons for optimism. 
The establishment of frequent workshops that engaged in intense dialogues about controversial issues, 
such as a NWFZ in the Middle East and the possibility of obtaining negative security assurances, 
meant that the European Union had helped to address the core problems surrounding Iran, and this 
has contributed immeasurably to the strengthening of the NPT. 
Participants in the session seemed to agree that because of the subjective and politicized debates 
surrounding non-compliance issues, there might never be complete agreement on the basic problems 
underlying the NPT. In this context, an important recommendation was that the Review Conference be 
mutually-supportive of other processes and high-level dialogues, particularly those related to compliance 
management, conﬁ dence-building measures, and Iran’s evolving policy, uranium enrichment, and 
reprocessing.
In order to avoid further erosion of the NPT, it may be necessary at some point to address divisive issues 
and loopholes created by the actions of some countries, such as North Korea and Iran. In the past, 
diplomatic considerations and the necessity of avoiding a procedural quagmire meant that some issues, 
like the status of North Korea, were purposely not dealt with during the NPT Preparatory Committee 
meetings. Yet the basic question remained: at what price do we ignore developments on the ground in 
favor of upholding the Treaty? Accordingly, it was discussed whether diplomats should confront these 
issues at the upcoming Review Conference or avoid them. 
TRANSPARENCY, IRREVERSIBILITY, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
Mexican Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba suggested that there should be a focus on compliance 
through addressing the reporting process. In the Review process, formal reports are an acknowledgment 
of compliance or non-compliance. He urged that countries in compliance should “own” the Treaty and 
act as a model for compliance. He suggested that transparency be considered not only in referring to the 
nuclear materials themselves but the transparency required in being honest about Treaty commitments. 
He suggested that work start before the NPT Review Conference to establish a process and model for 
reporting by working with NGOs and think tanks, and that the U.N. Department for Disarmament 
Affairs be engaged in establishing such a model. He noted that states already report on human rights, 
chemical weapons and drugs. He argued that NGOs are needed an independent source to verify the 
reports. He thought the reporting model might need to be established in a parallel process because of 
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the difﬁ culty in achieving consensus. 
Dr. Frank von Hippel, speaking on veriﬁ cation, noted that the world has the technical know-how to count 
warheads without giving away design secrets. He also noted that “nuclear archeology” enables a physical 
analysis to verify and calculate the amounts of previously produced ﬁ ssile materials. Past production 
records are also useful, although that evidence degrades over time. He reported on legal efforts to force 
the Bush administration to declare purportedly “sensitive” information about ﬁ ssile materials. Addressing 
the issue of irreversibility, Dr. von Hippel said we needed to work in stages; ﬁ rst storing the materials; 
second dismantling the warheads into plutonium pits and triggers; and third converting the pits into 
reactor fuel by blending down weapons grade materials. Neither Russia nor the United States have the 
conversion facilities needed to accomplish the down-blending. Russia is currently keeping warheads 
in “secure storage” at Mayak, according to Dr. von Hippel; the United States stores warheads in Texas. 
He suggested establishing an International Panel of NGO Experts to address issues of veriﬁ cation and 
irreversibility, similar to the one set up by the Climate Change Initiative.
During the discussion, it was noted by some that popular support could be galvanized on the issue of 
reporting. It would be important to strengthen compliance by querying U.S. and Russian ofﬁ cials on 
a regular basis about their progress toward transparency under the Moscow Treaty. Many discussants 
emphasized the problems surrounding relatively modest levels of formal reporting and the need for a 
marked increase in participation to ensure acceptable levels of accountability and ownership. 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, unanimously passed on April 28, 2004, requires, inter alia, 
that all countries prohibit terrorist and other non-state actors from acquiring nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons and missiles for their delivery. It also requires the establishment of export controls 
and other measures to prevent proliferation and requires that states report back on the implementation 
of the Resolution.
Ambassador Lászlo Mólnár of Hungary noted that a continuous common effort by all U.N. member 
states and relevant bodies is needed to counter the threat of non-state actors acquiring the capacity to 
use weapons of mass destruction. Amb. Mólnár disputed assertions that 1540 is a “bad resolution” or “a 
quick ﬁ x,” arguing that it does indeed ﬁ ll a gap and is a signal in favor of multilateralism. He emphasized 
that 1540 would not change the non-proliferation regime, but rather would complement it. He also 
asserted that openness and transparency is crucial, and that the Security Council must remain the ﬁ nal 
arbiter of compliance with non-proliferation.
Mr. Alyn Ware of the International Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms—after pointing out the shortcomings 
of the Resolution in emphasizing nonproliferation over disarmament and imposing on states obligations 
better negotiated through treaties—highlighted opportunities that the Resolution presents for the 
strengthening of norms against nuclear weapons, as well as the opportunity to promote actions to further 
non-proliferation and disarmament goals. To this end, he advocated a “jujitsu” approach—using the 
momentum from these non-proliferation goals to further disarmament.
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Thus, in implementing 1540, Mr. Ware’s approach would include encouraging individual states to: 
(a) make good faith efforts to implement material controls and other measures to prevent proliferation 
as required under operational paragraph 3 of the Resolution; (b) in the case of non-nuclear weapons 
states, adopt legislation prohibiting the acquisition, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by both state 
and non-state actors, and prohibiting nuclear weapons from their territory; (c) extend such criminal 
legislation to apply to citizens extra-territorially and to embrace universal jurisdiction over any such 
acts regardless of nationality or location of the act; (d) include the internal waters, territorial waters 
and airspace in the territory from which nuclear weapons are prohibited; and (e) in their reports to the 
Security Council 1540 Committee, emphasize the requirement of all states to implement both non-
proliferation and disarmament aspects of the Resolution.
Inadequacies in the Resolution were highlighted during the discussion. Concerns included: taking 
non-proliferation outside of the existing treaties, thus undermining the disarmament norms of the 
treaties; the engagement of the Security Council in dictating national and even local legislation; and 
the vagueness of standards in the Resolution such as its calls for “appropriate” legislation and measures. 
Such vagueness leaves room for ad hoc interpretation and enforcement. Moreover, Resolution 1540 
fails to reinforce the condemnation of nuclear weapons per se and focuses on individuals who might 
possess them. Additionally, the resolution fails to address the very real dangers posed by vulnerability 
of nuclear power plants.
SPACE WEAPONIZATION AND OTHER HURDLES TO PROGRESS 
Mr. Detlev Wolter of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations laid out a framework 
for a comprehensive multilateral treaty on Common Security in Outer Space (CSOS). His proposal 
would complement the NPT and help ﬁ ll the void left by the now abandoned Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty. Principles of the proposed CSOS Treaty include a foundation of common security in outer 
space, transparency, conﬁ dence-building measures, and the principle of equality. A CSOS Treaty would 
allow for limited missile defenses, i.e. land and sea-based missile defenses, to be controlled either by the 
Security Council or an International Space Agency. Existing military applications in space would be 
acceptable, such as communications and surveillance satellites. Space weapons would be banned; the 
ban would be buttressed through non-offensive force conﬁ gurations. 
Mr. Wolter argued that a ban on development and production of space weapons may be too ambitious 
right now, but a ban on their deployment would slow, if not stop, the development of space weapons. 
Some discussants objected to the proposal to establish an international missile defense, arguing that it 
would be preferable to support a veriﬁ able missile ban treaty. 
At the moment, a CSOS Treaty seems difﬁ cult to negotiate in a consensus-based manner at the C.D. 
or in the NPT framework. Instead, the possibility of a group of states, perhaps middle powers, to 
start negotiating such a treaty should be considered. Once the very large majority of states join such 
negotiations, other states that might still be reluctant will follow.
Ms. Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focused on hurdles posed 
by the United States that are preventing progress on disarmament. She acknowledged that in the United 
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States, “disarmament has slipped so far down on the agenda,” a result of “a purposeful strategy of the 
current U.S. administration to de-emphasize…disarmament… to enhance strategic ﬂ exibility.” This 
has been a successful strategy, she added. The current slow, opaque arms control underway is a result 
of “distaste of certain actors within the administration [for] international treaties and legal regimes.” 
Therefore, she asserted, this is not an insurmountable problem. 
Ms. Gottemoeller noted U.S. reductions in strategic weapons are taking place under the SORT 
agreement with Russia, with “a 50 percent reduction in all U.S. nuclear warheads” to be achieved by 
2012. Attaining transparency and irreversibility remains the problem, making it difﬁ cult to push the 
Russians to make more reductions on their side. On the other hand, she said, there is a real opportunity 
to get the Bush administration to open up their stockpile plan to some scrutiny, to be used as a tool to 
push the Russians to further reductions. Some players in Washington are very keen to do this, especially 
prior to the Review Conference. 
The following recommendations were discussed: (a) international discussions, perhaps initiated by 
middle power countries, to begin negotiations on a Common Security in Outer Space Treaty; (b) all 
missile defense programs should be placed under international control, to ensure that they are solely for 
defensive uses; and (c) in the absence of a program of work in the C.D., the Review Conference should 
recommend an intergovernmental conference to discuss concurrent measures on a ﬁ ssile materials treaty, 
the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and nuclear disarmament. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The global bargain underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the renunciation of 
nuclear weapons, now undertaken by over 180 countries, in return for the promise of disarmament 
and the guarantee of access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The challenge is to make good on 
that bargain, on both sides of the table.
One critical element is to prevent the spread of nuclear technology from assisting the spread of nuclear 
weapons. A second is to induce compliance with arms control/disarmament commitments. Those 
commitments are now well speciﬁ ed in the ﬁ nal documents of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 
Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. They are also set forth in the 2004 and other UN General 
Assembly resolutions sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden.
Undeniably, the challenge of making the NPT bargain work has become more acute. Indeed, the recent 
Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change starkly 
warned: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become 
irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” On the one hand, the know-how and technology 
for production of weapons have become more widespread, and a handful of the 189 states parties have 
violated in major or minor ways their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT and associated 
safeguards agreements. On the other hand, the United States, a leader in the construction of the post-
World War II international legal order, including the NPT, has become distinctly cold toward veriﬁ ed, 
universally applied international agreements that would regulate its actions like those of other states.
The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) is an international civil society coalition that works to support the 
efforts of New Agenda and other middle power states to press for fulﬁ llment of the NPT disarmament 
obligation. MPI believes that under present circumstances, the right course is to hold ﬁ rm to the 
obligations and commitments of non-proliferation and disarmament assumed by the parties to the NPT 
at its commencement and reinforced and elaborated at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.
MPI makes the following recommendations to middle power countries. They concern points contained 
in the 2004 New Agenda General Assembly resolution and other matters MPI believes deserve priority 
attention.
Recommendations
1) Standing down nuclear forces: Middle power countries should press the United States and Russia, 
and other nuclear-armed states, to implement the commitment to decreasing operational readiness of 
nuclear weapons systems by planning and implementing a program to stand down their nuclear forces, 
culminating in a global stand-down by the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
2) Veriﬁ ed, transparent, irreversible reductions: Middle power countries should press the United States 
and Russia to apply the principles of irreversibility, transparency, and veriﬁ cation to strategic reductions 
under the Moscow Treaty, and to negotiate further deep, veriﬁ ed, and irreversible cuts in their total 
arsenals, encompassing both warheads and delivery systems.
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3) Non-strategic reductions: Middle power countries should press for the United States to withdraw 
unilaterally its bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; for a wider process of control of U.S. 
and Russian non-strategic weapons, through formalization and veriﬁ cation of the 1991-1992 initiatives, 
transparency steps, and security measures; and for commencement of negotiations regarding further 
reduction/elimination of non-strategic weapons.
4) Control of ﬁ ssile materials and nuclear fuel production technology: Middle power countries should 
press for action on several fronts related to ﬁ ssile materials: 1) negotiations on an effectively veriﬁ able 
ﬁ ssile materials treaty as agreed in 1995 and 2000, with the understanding that the negotiations can and 
should address a range of issues, including dealing with existing military materials; 2) development of a 
global inventory of weapons-usable ﬁ ssile materials and warheads; and 3) accelerated progress in placing 
U.S., Russian, and other nuclear weapons state “excess” military ﬁ ssile materials under international 
veriﬁ cation. Middle power countries should also seriously consider proposals for banning production of all 
weapons-usable ﬁ ssile material, whether “civil” or military, and for establishment of multilateral controls 
on the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology and a moratorium on its 
supply and acquisition in the meantime.
5) Ending nuclear testing: Middle power countries should support a continued moratorium on nuclear 
testing, continued work by and funding for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organization, and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
6) Stopping vertical proliferation: Middle power countries should demand compliance with the 
commitment to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies instead of vertical proliferation 
in nuclear weapons-related doctrines and capabilities, and a full accounting of how that commitment is 
being met. They should also press for negotiation of a legally binding instrument on non-use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT.
7) Complete nuclear disarmament: Middle power countries should press for agreement on a program of 
work in the Conference on Disarmament that includes establishment of a subsidiary body dealing with 
nuclear disarmament.
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INTRODUCTION: STOPPING “A CASCADE OF PROLIFERATION”
The global bargain underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the renunciation of 
nuclear weapons, now undertaken by over 180 countries, in return for the promise of disarmament and 
the guarantee of access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The challenge is to make good on that 
bargain, on both sides of the table. One critical element is to prevent the spread of nuclear technology 
from assisting the spread of nuclear weapons. A second is to induce compliance with now well-speciﬁ ed 
disarmament commitments.
Undeniably, the challenge of making the NPT bargain work has become more acute. Indeed, the recent 
Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change starkly 
warned: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become 
irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” On the one hand, the know-how and technology 
for production of weapons have become more widespread, and a handful of the 189 states parties have 
violated in major or minor ways their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT and associated 
safeguards agreements. On the other hand, the United States, a leader in the construction of the post-
World War II international legal order, including the NPT, has become distinctly cold toward veriﬁ ed, 
universally applied international agreements that would regulate its actions like those of other states.
The Middle Powers Initiative believes that under these circumstances, the right course is to hold ﬁ rm 
to the obligations and commitments of non-proliferation and disarmament assumed by the parties 
to the NPT at its commencement and reinforced and elaborated at the 1995 and 2000 Review 
Conferences.
When the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s, the United States and Soviet Union rebuffed efforts to 
include commitments to speciﬁ c arms control/disarmament measures in the operational provisions, 
agreeing only to the general obligation set forth in Article VI to negotiate in good faith effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Signiﬁ cantly, 
though, immediately after the NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, the two superpowers 
placed speciﬁ c measures before the predecessor to today’s Conference on Disarmament. Under a heading 
taken from Article VI, they proposed an agenda including “the cessation of testing, the non-use of 
nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of ﬁ ssionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of 
manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles….”
Some 36 years later, the world is still wrestling with those measures. Indeed, none has been deﬁ nitively 
achieved. While there has been reduction of nuclear stockpiles, it is mostly from astronomical levels that 
were attained after the NPT entered into force in 1970. One thing is different: commitments to arms 
control/disarmament measures have now been more closely integrated into the NPT process, because 
they were approved by states participating in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 
Review Conference as the means for implementation of the Article VI obligation. The “practical steps 
for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI” adopted in 2000 are attached as 
Appendix One.
A key player in articulation of the program of practical steps has been the New Agenda Coalition 
formed by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden. Most recently, in 
the 2004 session of the United Nations General Assembly, New Agenda offered a resolution entitled 
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“Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (Appendix Two). The intent 
was to identify consensus-based steps to obtain the widest possible support heading into the 2005 
Review Conference, and in particular to build a bridge to NATO states. The resolution also sought to 
highlight areas in which the nuclear weapons states could begin action prior to the Conference, laying 
the foundation for a constructive outcome.
The New Agenda Coalition succeeded in attracting wide support, notably from key NATO countries. 
The General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 151 to six, with 24 abstentions. Eight NATO 
member states voted for the resolution, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Lithuania and Turkey. In 2002 and 2003, Canada had been the lone NATO supporter. Also 
signiﬁ cant was that key U.S. allies Japan and South Korea voted afﬁ rmatively for the ﬁ rst time since 
2000. The resolution has thus formed a potential basis for a working partnership of states within and 
without nuclear alliances to exert leverage on the nuclear weapons states to take steps to resuscitate the 
faltering non-proliferation regime.  Negative votes came from the three Western nuclear weapons states, 
the United States, Britain, and France, joined by Israel, Latvia, and Palau. 
In its preambular paragraphs, the resolution expresses concern over the lack of implementation of 
binding disarmament obligations, reafﬁ rms that non-proliferation and disarmament processes are 
mutually reinforcing, and recalls the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals given 
in 2000 (practical step 6). In its operative paragraphs, the resolution calls for full compliance with 
disarmament and non-proliferation commitments; universal adherence to the NPT and early entry into 
force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; accelerated implementation of the practical disarmament 
steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; further steps to reduce non-strategic arsenals and 
non-development of new types of nuclear weapons; and establishment of a subsidiary body within the 
Conference on Disarmament to address nuclear disarmament. It also agrees to resumption of negotiations 
in the Conference on Disarmament on an effectively veriﬁ able Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty and to 
completion of arrangements for nuclear weapons states to place excess military ﬁ ssile material under 
international veriﬁ cation. Finally, it underlines the principles of irreversibility and transparency and the 
development of veriﬁ cation capabilities.
The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) is an international civil society coalition that works to support the 
efforts of New Agenda and other middle power states to press for fulﬁ llment of the NPT disarmament 
obligation. Taking as its reference point the 2000 “practical steps for the systematic and progressive 
efforts to implement Article VI,” this brieﬁ ng paper focuses on measures highlighted in the New Agenda 
resolution and certain other matters MPI regards as priorities, standing down nuclear forces, deep cuts, 
and controlling the spread of technology for production of nuclear fuel.
1) STANDING DOWN NUCLEAR FORCES
Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems (practical step 9d)
This commitment goes to the core of the nuclear dilemma. So long as the United States and Russia 
maintain many hundreds of nuclear warheads ready for immediate use and contend that this posture 
is essential to their security, implementation of the entire nuclear arms control/disarmament program 
is fraught with difﬁ culty.
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It is sometimes said that problems are solved when they are no longer problems. In that vein, massive 
nuclear arsenals will not be reduced and eliminated until the nuclear weapons states stop relying on 
them in an operational sense, in accordance with their commitment (step 9e) to a “diminishing role 
for nuclear weapons in security policies.” 
Other negative aspects of continued hair-trigger deployment are the heightened risk of accidental 
or unauthorized use, the danger and reinforced tension should serious conﬂ ict arise, and the moral 
debilitation inherent in maintenance of an implied threat of societal annihilation as a basis for national 
security. A less well understood risk, highlighted by Bruce Blair of the Center for Defense Information, 
is increased vulnerability to diversion of warheads to terrorists in Russia due to the shipment of large 
numbers of warheads between a remanufacturing facility and dispersed military bases.
Since 2000 there has been little progress in this area. One could argue that the 2002 Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) between Russia and the United States commits those states 
to reduction of operational status. It requires the removal of thousands of strategic warheads from 
operational deployment in 2012 while permitting the two states to retain the warheads in storage, ready 
for redeployment. The United States has reduced deployed strategic warheads to about 4500, below 
the START I permitted level of about 6000. Russia has about the same number of operational strategic 
warheads. However, implementation of reductions prior to 2012 is not required by the treaty. Further, 
the achievement of levels of 1700 to 2200 deployed strategic warheads in or before 2012 will not 
fundamentally alter the preparedness of each state to initiate immediately a large-scale nuclear attack.
Non-governmental expert analysis of the mechanics of a stand-down of nuclear forces, often referred to 
as “de-alerting,” is ongoing. There are two dimensions: increasing assurance that no attack is underway; 
and decreasing the capability to immediately launch an attack. Possible steps are illustrated by a recent 
Rand Corporation study, Beyond the Nuclear Shadow, supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative: 
assistance to Russia for its early-warning radars or satellites; creation of a U.S.-Russian early-warning 
system using sensors placed outside missile silos; standing down nuclear forces to be reduced under the 
Moscow Treaty; restrictions on the operating area of nuclear-armed submarines; removal of counterforce 
capable warheads (e.g., Trident W-88 warheads); reduction of launch readiness of ICBMs; reduction 
of launch readiness of all nuclear forces; installation of destruct-after-launch mechanisms on ballistic 
missiles; and elimination of doctrines of launch on warning and rapid counterforce strikes.
Recommendation: Middle power countries should press the United States and Russia, and other nuclear-
armed states, to implement the commitment to decreasing operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems 
by planning and implementing a program to stand down their nuclear forces, culminating in a global stand-
down by the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
2) VERIFIED, TRANSPARENT, IRREVERSIBLE REDUCTIONS
Adherence to the principles of irreversibility, transparency, and veriﬁ cation; deep cuts (practical steps 5, 6, 
7, 9b, 13)
The practical steps embody principles of irreversibility, transparency, and veriﬁ cation. In addition 
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to agreeing to further development of veriﬁ cation capabilities, the 2000 agenda endorsed START II 
and III, U.S.-Russian reduction agreements that envisaged extensive veriﬁ ed dismantlement of both 
delivery systems and, innovatively in START III, warheads. It was a signal achievement to embed the 
principles in the practical steps. They are essential to states’ participation in reduction of nuclear forces 
to low levels and certainly to their elimination. More generally, they undergird trust and accountability, 
preconditions for cooperative security.
In perhaps the most important instance of backsliding on the practical steps since 2000, the United 
States, with Russia’s acquiescence, has emphatically rejected the principles, premising policy instead 
on retention of ﬂ exibility to reconﬁ gure nuclear forces. The 2002 Moscow Treaty applies the policy 
of ﬂ exibility. It requires Russia and the United States each to deploy no more than 2200 long-range 
strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2012. But unlike existing agreements (e.g., INF Treaty, START 
I), the abandoned START II, and the projected START III, it contains no provisions for veriﬁ cation, 
transparency, and irreversible dismantlement in relation to the warheads and delivery systems removed 
from deployment. Monitoring mechanisms under START I may provide a means of veriﬁ cation, 
though they would not fulﬁ ll the principle of irreversibility. However, START I expires in 2009. U.S. 
intelligence reportedly has advised the Bush administration that absent extension of START I, reliable 
veriﬁ cation of Russian reductions will not be possible.
The practical steps also are premised on deep cuts in U.S.-Russian arsenals. Practical step 6 sets forth 
the unequivocal undertaking to elimination of nuclear arsenals. Step 7, in calling for the preservation 
of the now defunct ABM Treaty, refers to “further reductions of strategic offensive weapons” beyond 
those planned for START III. Step 9f calls for the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear 
weapons states in the process leading to total elimination of their nuclear weapons. The position taken 
by China and other states is that this will be “appropriate” when U.S. and Russian arsenals have reached 
much lower levels. Looking forward, progress toward elimination of nuclear arsenals will require veriﬁ ed 
and irreversible reduction of the U.S. and Russian arsenals far below presently projected levels. A glance 
at the current and projected status of nuclear arsenals as estimated by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council conﬁ rms this:
•  Today the United States has over 10,000 warheads, with about 4,500 deployed strategic and 800 
deployed non-strategic warheads.
• By 2012, after implementation of the 2002 Moscow Treaty, the United States will still have about 
6,000 warheads. That includes 2,200 deployed strategic warheads with well more than 2,000 in 
reserve, and hundreds of deployed and reserve non-strategic warheads.
• Russia presently has perhaps 17,000 warheads, with about 4,400 operational strategic and 3,400 
operational non-strategic warheads, plus many thousands in reserve, storage, or awaiting disassembly. 
In 2012, under the Moscow Treaty, Russia, like the United States, can have up to 2,200 deployed 
strategic warheads, plus reserve and non-strategic warheads in unlimited numbers.
• China, France, Britain, Israel, India, and Pakistan all have arsenals in the low hundreds or less. None 
has made any speciﬁ c commitment to reduce its arsenal.
• The total world count of intact nuclear warheads is in the range of 28,000. Including plutonium 
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cores from disassembled warheads, the total is over 36,000, according to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute.
Despite the clear need to set in motion cuts to total warhead arsenals going well below the Moscow Treaty 
levels for deployed strategic warheads, there are no publicly known plans for U.S.-Russian negotiations 
regarding further strategic reductions or reductions of non-strategic weapons. Nor are other nuclear-
armed states engaged in any negotiations regarding reduction of nuclear forces. A positive development 
is that, as it has reported to NPT PrepComs, Britain is exploring technologies that could be used for 
multilateral veriﬁ cation of warhead dismantlement.
Recommendation: Middle power countries should press the United States and Russia to apply the principles 
of irreversibility, transparency, and veriﬁ cation to strategic reductions under the Moscow Treaty, and to 
negotiate further deep, veriﬁ ed, and irreversible cuts in their total arsenals, encompassing both warheads 
and delivery systems.
3) NON-STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS
Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part 
of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process (practical step 9c)
There has been no publicly reported progress on non-strategic reductions since 2000. Indeed, the 
1991 Bush-Gorbachev parallel unilateral withdrawals of non-strategic arms from deployment have yet 
to be subjected to the requirements of the “reduction and disarmament process”; that is, they are not 
transparent, they are not irreversible, they have not been veriﬁ ed, and they have not been codiﬁ ed in 
legally binding form.
No ofﬁ cial ﬁ gures are available on tactical arsenals of the United States and Russia. Russia has 3400 or 
more operational tactical warheads, with thousands more in reserve or in storage, and the United States 
has 800 operational tactical warheads, with hundreds more in reserve or storage. China’s non-strategic 
arsenal is estimated to consist of between 100 and 300 warheads.
The United States is the only country to deploy non-strategic or any warheads on the territory of other 
states. According to a recent Natural Resources Defense Council estimate revising upward its earlier 
ﬁ gure, 480 U.S. bombs for delivery by aircraft are deployed under NATO auspices in ﬁ ve “non-nuclear 
weapons state” European NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey), as 
well as in Britain. This impedes efforts to negotiate with Russia regarding reductions of non-strategic 
weapons, appears to violate Articles I and II of the NPT, and perpetuates a terrible precedent for other 
nuclear powers to deploy nuclear weapons outside their territory and to share them with non-nuclear 
weapons states.
In a working paper for the 2002 NPT PrepCom, Germany called for formalization and veriﬁ cation 
of implementation of the 1991-1992 Bush-Gorbachev initiatives, reciprocal exchange of information 
between NATO and Russia, and commencement of U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-
strategic nuclear weapons. Resolutions addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons offered by the New 
Agenda Coalition in 2002 and 2003 were to similar effect. Motivated in part by concerns regarding the 
status of Russian warheads, the resolutions called for security measures including placement of warheads 
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in central storage sites with a view to their removal and elimination.
There are multiple important reasons, noted above, for U.S. withdrawal of non-strategic bombs from 
Europe. It is also important to increase transparency, especially regarding Russian stocks, and to draw 
non-strategic weapons into bilateral and multilateral negotiations. It should also be recognized, though, 
that “non-strategic” weapons may need to be addressed in connection with “strategic” weapons. They 
are not always easily distinguishable categories, whether based on yield, mission, or even range of 
delivery.
Recommendation: Middle power countries should press for the United States to withdraw unilaterally its 
bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; for a wider process of control of U.S. and Russian non-
strategic weapons, through formalization and veriﬁ cation of the 1991-1992 initiatives, transparency steps, 
and security measures; and for commencement of negotiations regarding further reduction/elimination of 
non-strategic weapons.
4) CONTROL OF FISSILE MATERIALS
Negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and international and effectively veriﬁ able treaty banning 
the production of ﬁ ssile material for nuclear weapons (practical step 3); placement of “excess” military ﬁ ssile 
materials under international veriﬁ cation (steps 8, 10)
Fissile materials treaty: Negotiation of a ﬁ ssile materials treaty repeats one of the two principal speciﬁ c 
commitments made in connection with the 1995 indeﬁ nite extension of the NPT (the other was to 
completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). As laid down in practical step 3 (see Appendix One 
for full text), the commitment was robust. 
First, step 3 incorporates the 1995 Shannon mandate for the negotiations. Canada’s Ambassador Shannon 
reported in 1995 that “it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate … does not preclude any 
delegation from raising for consideration” issues including but not limited to past production of ﬁ ssile 
materials and management of ﬁ ssile materials. Second, step 3 also refers to “taking into consideration 
both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives,” further suggesting that the scope 
of negotiations is not limited to a ban on future production of military ﬁ ssile materials. Third, step 3 
contains a time component, urging the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a program of work 
“which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their 
conclusion within ﬁ ve years.” (Emphasis added.)
Despite the clarity of the 1995 and 2000 commitments, they were not fulﬁ lled. This was primarily 
due to the insistence of China and a handful of other states that negotiations also commence in the 
consensus-governed Conference on Disarmament on prevention of weaponization of outer space and 
on nuclear disarmament. In 2003, China moved to break the years-long deadlock by accepting a widely 
agreed proposal to negotiate a ﬁ ssile materials treaty (FMT) while only discussing nuclear disarmament 
and prevention of space weaponization.
However, the other key party, the United States, has yet to state a position on the proposal. Further, it 
now favors, as stated in the General Assembly in fall 2004, negotiation of an FMT “without veriﬁ cation 
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provisions.” The United States and Palau cast the only negative votes against a Canada-sponsored 
resolution in the 2004 General Assembly urging the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a program 
of work and commence negotiations on an “effectively veriﬁ able” FMT in accordance with the Shannon 
mandate. Britain and Israel abstained, raising further questions about prospects for negotiations under 
the Shannon mandate.
The United States ignored Canada’s explanation “that the existing mandate permits any CD member 
to raise any issue or concern about the envisaged treaty during the course of negotiations.” The United 
States also argued that negotiation of a non-veriﬁ ed FMT would shorten the time it takes to bring a ban 
into force that would stop the growth of military stockpiles. If that is truly the concern, it can be met 
by interim measures like a formalized moratorium applying to all nuclear weapons-possessing states. 
However, such interim measures must not be seen as a substitute for a universal, veriﬁ ed FMT.
In looking ahead to negotiations on an FMT, and to a Review Conference agreement on such 
negotiations, there are several important considerations.
a) A ban on future production of military ﬁ ssile materials is needed because it would stop the ongoing 
growth of such stocks in India, Pakistan, and Israel, and make permanent the existing halt to such 
production by the NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapons states.
b) However, a ban on future production is insufﬁ cient. To lay a foundation for progress in reduction 
and elimination of nuclear arsenals and nuclear weapons capabilities, an FMT should also address 
existing ﬁ ssile materials in stocks and warheads held by nuclear-armed states. South Africa has 
proposed that an FMT would verify the control and disposition of ﬁ ssile materials declared “excess” 
to military needs, thus tying it to a process of reducing stocks and warheads. Another possible 
approach is that an FMT could serve as a framework convention. It would both establish a ban 
on future military production and create a process for negotiation regarding reduction of existing 
materials.
c) A ban on production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for any purpose - weapons, 
ship propulsion, and civilian reactor operation - should also be seriously considered. Since such 
material is usable for weapons, its production and circulation inherently pose risks of diversion to 
weapons, including by terrorists. Such a ban has recently been urged by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace Study, Universal Compliance. Similarly but less sweepingly, the Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel recommended a ban on the production of HEU for any purpose.
d) Development of a global inventory of all weapons-usable ﬁ ssile materials and nuclear warheads, 
proposed by Germany, is needed. It could pursued as part of an FMT or separately. Global stocks 
of plutonium and HEU, both “civil” (but usable in weapons) and military continue to rise, with 
more than 3,700 metric tons in about 60 countries at the end of 2003.
“Excess” military ﬁ ssile materials: Practical steps 8 and 10 concern arrangements by the nuclear weapons 
states to place “excess” military ﬁ ssile materials under international veriﬁ cation, including through 
completion of the Trilateral Initiative among Russia, the United States, and the IAEA. While preparatory 
work continues, the United States and Russia have yet to ﬁ nalize any legally binding agreement with the 
IAEA, nor has any other nuclear weapons state. The United States and Russia are engaged in bilateral 
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initiatives aimed at control and disposition of “excess” HEU and plutonium, through the 1993 HEU 
Purchase Agreement, the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, and the 2002 
Accelerated Materials Disposition Initiative.
Nuclear fuel production technology: In the wake of revelations about the Khan nuclear proliferation 
network, the North Korean denial of IAEA monitoring of its ﬁ ssile materials production capabilities, 
and concerns that Iran may be seeking nuclear weapons capability, proposals have emerged to control 
the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology. A dozen or so countries 
now have such technology.
One proposed course of action is for exporting countries to deny the technology to additional states, as called 
for by President Bush. The G-8 responded to President Bush’s call by declaring a one-year moratorium on 
supply to non-possessing states, but the far larger Nuclear Suppliers Group has yet to take any action. 
A second course is indicated by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei’s call for “working towards 
multilateral control over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle - enrichment, reprocessing, and 
the management and disposal of spent fuel.” An expert group established by the IAEA is scheduled to 
report in March 2005.
The High-level Panel recommended a combination of voluntary action and multilateral control. It called 
for states to forgo for a limited period construction of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, with ﬁ ssile 
materials supplied at current market prices, while an arrangement is negotiated for the IAEA to act as 
a guarantor for the supply of ﬁ ssile materials for non-military use.
The matter is extremely sensitive. Non-nuclear weapons countries regard access to such technology as their 
right under Article IV of the NPT, and further resent what they regard as the implication that developing 
countries are not to be trusted with technology possessed by some developed states. The controversy 
casts a bitter light upon the history of the Atoms for Peace program, the IAEA, and the nuclear-power 
promoting NPT. As the 1946 U.S.-proposed Baruch plan illustrates, it was understood from the 
beginning of the nuclear age that the spread of nuclear technology, especially the means of producing 
fuel for nuclear reactors, would also provide the foundation for nuclear weapons programs.
The United States, the proponent of Atoms for Peace, is correct in returning to its initial view reﬂ ected 
in the Baruch plan that it is too dangerous to spread fuel-production technology around the world. 
For reasons of effectiveness, legitimacy, and promotion of global norms generally, multilateral control 
as favored by Mr. ElBaradei and the High-level Panel is the proper goal.
Recommendation: Middle power countries should press for action on several fronts related to ﬁ ssile materials: 
1) negotiations on an effectively veriﬁ able ﬁ ssile materials treaty as agreed in 1995 and 2000, with the 
understanding that the negotiations can and should address a range of issues, including dealing with existing 
military materials; 2) development of a global inventory of weapons-usable ﬁ ssile materials and warheads; 
and 3) accelerated progress in placing U.S., Russian, and other nuclear weapons state “excess” military ﬁ ssile 
materials under international veriﬁ cation. Middle power countries should also seriously consider proposals for 
banning production of all weapons-usable ﬁ ssile material, whether “civil” or military, and for establishment 
of multilateral controls on the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology and a 
moratorium on its supply and acquisition in the meantime.
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5) ENDING NUCLEAR TESTING
Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a moratorium on nuclear test explosions 
pending its entry into force (practical steps 1 and 2)
Establishment of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has long been regarded as central to 
compliance with Article VI. The CTBT is referred to in the NPT preamble, and completion of its 
negotiation was speciﬁ ed as a principal commitment in connection with the 1995 indeﬁ nite extension 
of the NPT. At the present time, a moratorium on testing continues to hold, but entry into force is 
nowhere in sight. The Bush administration opposes U.S. ratiﬁ cation of the treaty, and China, apparently 
watching the United States, has yet to ratify. India and Pakistan have yet to sign.
The moratorium may be at some risk during the second Bush administration. The Bush administration’s 
2005 budget request refers, for the ﬁ rst time, to production of a “list of possible test scenarios.” 
Fortunately, the U.S. Congress seems resistant to moves toward resumption of testing, recently refusing to 
approve the objective of reducing the time needed to prepare for tests, currently said to be two years.
The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is making great 
progress on ﬁ nalizing the already functioning International Monitoring System. Most countries, 
including the United States, are paying their shares of its budget.
Recommendation: Middle power countries should support a continued moratorium on nuclear testing, 
continued work by and funding for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
Organization, and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
6) STOPPING VERTICAL PROLIFERATION
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be 
used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination (practical step 9e)
This step, building upon the Article VI obligation of negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date, can be considered the anti-vertical proliferation commitment, encompassing both 
doctrines and capabilities.
Doctrines: As is well known, the trends have been negative regarding doctrines. The United States 
continues to plan, as it has for decades, for a massive retaliatory or preemptive “counterforce” attack 
in response to an actual or imminent nuclear attack, and for ﬁ rst use of nuclear weapons against an 
overwhelming conventional attack. In addition, the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review plans for an 
enlarged range of circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used, notably against non-
nuclear attacks or threats. It states that nuclear weapons “could be employed against targets able to 
withstand nonnuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities),” and 
contemplates their use in response to a biological or chemical attack. It also refers to nuclear use in 
response to “surprising military developments” and “unexpected contingencies.” Those new catch-all 
categories, inspired by the September 11 terrorist attacks, are virtually without limit. In December 
2002, the U.S. National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction made clear that 
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“overwhelming force” – a reference to a nuclear option – would be used against chemical and biological 
attacks. It also referred to preemptive attacks, and did not rule out nuclear use in such attacks.
In the late 1990s, Germany and Canada sought revision of NATO doctrine to rule out use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and to adopt a general no-ﬁ rst-use stance. The initiative 
was bluntly rejected by the Clinton administration, and NATO doctrine continues to highlight the role 
of nuclear weapons. Meeting in Washington, DC, in April 1999, the North Atlantic Council stated 
that the “supreme guarantee of the security of the allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of 
the Alliance.” Yet NATO also claims to be committed to implementing the conclusions of the 2000 
NPT Review Conference, as stated in the June 2002 communiqué of the NATO defense and nuclear 
planning ministerial meeting. Like and following the United States, NATO is accordingly mired in 
policy incoherence, despite the efforts of Canada, Germany, and other members.
The United States has not been alone in its continued doctrinal emphasis on possible use of nuclear 
weapons. In 1993, Russia abandoned its policy of renouncing the ﬁ rst use of nuclear arms, and its January 
2000 Security Concept stated that they could be used “to repulse armed aggression, if all other means 
of resolving the crisis have been exhausted.” Britain and France continue to retain the option of ﬁ rst 
use to defend “vital interests.” Pakistan expressly holds out the option of ﬁ rst use against conventional 
attack, and, imitating the United States, India announced possible ﬁ rst nuclear use in response to 
chemical or biological attacks.
Capabilities: Here too the trends have been negative, not only with regard to warheads, but also in relation 
to delivery systems and command and control. Russia recently announced, with some fanfare, that it is 
developing a superior new nuclear weapons system, apparently providing reentry vehicles a maneuvering 
capability. Britain is planning a replacement for its nuclear-armed Trident submarine. France is developing 
and ﬁ elding new missiles equipped with new warheads. China is modernizing its missile force.
As non-governmental analysts at Western States Legal Foundation and Natural Resources Defense 
Council have reported, U.S. projects include plans for a new ICBM to be deployed in 2018, some of 
which could be conventionally armed; plans for a new Trident submarine and for intermediate-range 
missiles to be based on submarines; work on improved accuracy for Trident missiles; extensive upgrades 
in computer software and hardware used to plan and execute nuclear strikes; development of new military 
communications satellites designed to allow survival during a nuclear war; development of theater and 
national missile defenses; and deployment of limited ground-based national missile defenses.
Some of the U.S. projects would improve capabilities for both nuclear and non-nuclear warﬁ ghting. 
While the United States contends that this demonstrates decreased reliance on nuclear forces, the effects 
nonetheless can be counterproductive in the nuclear sphere. Use of conventionally-armed missiles would 
run the risk of causing other states to believe they are under nuclear attack. More generally, other major 
states likely will be reluctant to agree to nuclear arms control/disarmament measures if they view their 
nuclear forces as a necessary deterrent to dramatically improved U.S. non-nuclear capabilities. That is 
all the more true should the United States eventually execute schemes for placing weapons in space.
So far as warheads are concerned, the U.S. Congress recently declined all requested funding for the 
nuclear earth penetrator, a modiﬁ cation of existing high yield weapons types, and for research on 
“advanced” concepts. While a positive development, not too much should be made of this. The U.S. 
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nuclear establishment will seek funding for these programs again. Moreover, Congress added $400 
million to the $6 billion plus spent last year on the nuclear weapons complex, and allocated $40 million 
to Los Alamos laboratory for a facility to build the plutonium cores for warheads. When spending on 
delivery systems and command and control is added, U.S. appropriations for nuclear forces are on the 
order of $40 billion annually. Work continues on maintaining and upgrading every weapons type in 
the U.S. arsenal. For example, money slated for “advanced” concepts will instead be spent on a “reliable 
replacement warhead” program.
Vertical proliferation in doctrines and capabilities, even as nuclear arsenals are reduced in size, points 
to the need to ﬁ nd ways to close the yawning gap between commitments made in the NPT forums 
and actual policies and practices. Fuller accounting by the nuclear weapons states, and aggressive and 
informed questioning of that accounting, could make a contribution.
Also worth pressing is negotiation of legally binding obligations of non-use of nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT, codifying and extending “negative security assurances” 
thus far made in declarations. In connection with the 1995 decision indeﬁ nitely extending the NPT, the 
Review and Extension Conference stated: “[F]urther steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear 
weapons States party to the Treaty against the use or threat or use of nuclear weapons. These steps could 
take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.” Non-use commitments ﬂ ow logically 
from non-nuclear weapons states’ renunciation of the weapons and those states very much want to see 
them legally codiﬁ ed. Such a legally binding instrument could be negotiated as a protocol to the NPT.
Recommendation: Middle power countries should demand compliance with the commitment to a diminishing 
role for nuclear weapons in security policies instead of vertical proliferation in nuclear weapons-related 
doctrines and capabilities, and a full accounting of how that commitment is being met. They should also press 
for negotiation of a legally binding instrument on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons 
state parties to the NPT.
7) COMPLETE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal 
with nuclear disarmament (practical step 4)
Implementation of this commitment was stymied by the same problem that prevented commencement 
of negotiations on a ﬁ ssile materials treaty, inability to agree on a program of work in the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD). Given China’s agreement to discuss nuclear disarmament and prevention of 
space weaponization while negotiating on ﬁ ssile materials, prospects are better for a breakthrough here. 
The United States and other states which have yet to agree to the proposed program should be pressed 
hard to do so, preferably prior to the Review Conference to enhance the chances of a cooperative 
outcome. Should this not occur, at the Review Conference states should not paper over the problem of 
reaching a consensus on a CD program of work. Otherwise, any purported agreement on addressing 
nuclear disarmament in the CD, or negotiating regarding ﬁ ssile materials, could turn out to be hollow, 
as occurred with the 2000 commitments. If such a consensus cannot be reached, other options for 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament and an FMT should be seriously considered.
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A CD body dealing with nuclear disarmament could be a useful forum, not least because it includes 
nuclear-armed states outside the NPT, Israel, Pakistan, and India. It could seek to ensure that the various 
existing and proposed unilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral initiatives and negotiations proceed in 
a complementary fashion in the direction of a nuclear weapon-free world. It could also grapple with 
the truth afﬁ rmed by the New Agenda General Assembly resolution of 2000, that “a nuclear weapon-
free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally 
binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.” A CD 
body could commence work on that legal and institutional framework, thereby facilitating compliance 
with the unanimous 1996 holding of the International Court of Justice that “there exists an obligation 
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects 
under strict and effective international control.”
Recommendation: Middle power countries should press for agreement on a program of work in the Conference 
on Disarmament that includes establishment of a subsidiary body dealing with nuclear disarmament.
CONCLUSION: PRESSING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
“Moving to a world of radically fewer nuclear weapons is less an issue of aspiration than an issue of perspiration” 
- Stephen J. Hadley, U.S. national security advisor elect, writing in 1997
A world free of nuclear weapons, not just with radically fewer weapons, is the objective legally required 
by the NPT and the most appropriate to safeguarding human security. That said, the Middle Powers 
Initiative appreciates Mr. Hadley’s sentiment that progress requires hard work and practical measures. 
In that spirit, and as the 2004 New Agenda General Assembly resolution contemplates, MPI observes 
that prior to the 2005 Review Conference, it is quite feasible for the nuclear weapons states to take 
steps that will greatly increase the prospects for a positive outcome.
Agreement is within reach on a program of work in the Conference on Disarmament, encompassing 
among other things commencement of negotiations on a ﬁ ssile materials treaty and establishment of a 
body to deal with nuclear disarmament.
It is also eminently feasible for the United States and Russia to begin work within established mechanisms 
on transparency, veriﬁ cation, and irreversibility measures as to reductions under the Moscow Treaty.
It is also possible for states to commit to the creation of multilateral control on the spread of uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, and to a moratorium on its supply and acquisition 
pending agreement on such control.
The middle power countries should exert every effort to press for the above steps to be taken. Further, 
it is practicable for the nuclear weapons states to start movement in the near future toward meeting 
every commitment discussed in this brieﬁ ng paper. The Review Conference should in a serious and 
substantive way hold them accountable for meeting those and other commitments.
1.  The importance and urgency of signatures and 
ratiﬁ cations, without delay and without conditions and 
in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve 
the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty.
2.  A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or 
any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of 
that Treaty. 
3.  The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on 
Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and 
internationally and effectively veriﬁ able treaty banning 
the production of ﬁ ssile material for nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the 
statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the 
mandate contained therein, taking into consideration 
both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation 
objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged 
to agree on a programme of work which includes the 
immediate commencement of negotiations on such a 
treaty with a view to their conclusion within ﬁ ve years. 
4.  The necessity of establishing in the Conference on 
Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with 
a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The 
Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a 
programme of work which includes the immediate 
establishment of such a body. 
5.  The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear 
disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control 
and reduction measures. 
6.  An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon 
States to accomplish the total elimination of their 
nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to 
which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7.  The early entry into force and full implementation of 
START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as 
possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM 
Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as 
a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive 
weapons, in accordance with its provisions. 
8.  The completion and implementation of the Trilateral 
Initiative between the United States of America, the 
Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.
9.  Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear 
disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, 
and based on the principle of undiminished security for 
all:
* Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce 
their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.  
* Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States 
with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and 
the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article 
VI and as a voluntary conﬁ dence-building measure to 
support further progress on nuclear disarmament.  
* The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, 
based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of 
the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. 
* Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the 
operational status of nuclear weapons systems.  
* A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security 
policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever 
be used and to facilitate the process of their total 
elimination.  
* The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the 
nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the 
total elimination of their nuclear weapons. 
10.  Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, 
as soon as practicable, ﬁ ssile material designated by 
each of them as no longer required for military purposes 
under IAEA or other relevant international veriﬁ cation 
and arrangements for the disposition of such material for 
peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains 
permanently outside of military programmes.
11.  Reafﬁ rmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of 
States in the disarmament process is general and complete 
disarmament under effective international control.
12.  Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT 
strengthened review process, by all States parties on the 
implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 
1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 
July 1996.
13.  The further development of the veriﬁ cation capabilities 
that will be required to provide assurance of compliance 
with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement 
and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
13 PRACTICAL STEPS
EXCERPTED FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE NPT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement 
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision 
on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:
MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE
A program of the Global Security Institute
Through the Middle Powers Initiative, eight international non-governmental
organizations work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and
educate the nuclear weapon states to take immediate practical steps that reduce
nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is
guided by an International Steering Committee chaired by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C.,
former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador.                              www.middlepowers.org
GLOBAL SECURITY INSTITUTE
Promoting security for all through the elimination of nuclear weapons
The Global Security Institute, founded by Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000), has
developed an exceptional team that includes former heads of state and government,
distinguished diplomats, effective politicians, committed celebrities, religious leaders,
Nobel Peace Laureates, and concerned citizens. This team works to achieve
incremental steps that enhance security and lead to the global elimination of nuclear
weapons. GSI works through four result-oriented program areas that target specific
influential constituencies.                                                                    www.gsinstitute.org
THE CARTER CENTER
Creating a world in which every man, woman, and child has the opportunity to enjoy
good health and live in peace.
The Carter Center, in partnership with Emory University, is committed to advancing
human rights and alleviating unnecessary human suffering. Founded in 1982 by former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, the Atlanta-based Center has
helped to improve the quality of life for people in more than 65 countries. Led by the
Carters and an independent board of trustees, the Center's staff wage peace, fight
disease, and build hope by both engaging with those at the highest levels of
government and working side by side with poor and often forgotten people.
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